On Thursday night, Nikola Mirotic played his first game for the Milwaukee Bucks, after being acquired at the trade deadline in exchange for Jason Smith, Stanley Johnson, and multiple second round draft picks. Much has been written about Niko’s fit with the team and his potential playoff impact, but what I’d really like to focus on is the amazing confluence of events that enabled the trade to happen at all.
Dealing a few second round picks and a couple expiring contracts (Smith and Johnson) for a single player looks like a fairly mundane transaction on paper, but for Milwaukee, it required a mix of planning, execution, and good fortune that’s remarkable in its complexity. The deal ultimately relied on so many trade rules, prior transactions, and favorable circumstances that it’s hard to catalog them all—yet I’ll try anyway.
(A) How Milwaukee Obtained Its Trade Assets
The assets that the Bucks exchanged for Niko came from a number of prior moves, precisely undertaken in connection with league rules and to maximize future value. Those moves include the following:
- On July 9, 2015, the Bucks traded Jared Dudley to the Wizards. Because NBA rules require that the Wizards send something back in return, Milwaukee received Washington’s top-55 protected 2020 pick—a future top-55 protected pick being the gold standard in minimal returns. Teams are not allowed to protect picks any more restrictively than that.
- On November 7, 2017, the Bucks traded Greg Monroe, a protected 1st round pick, and a 2nd round pick for Eric Bledsoe. In doing so, the Bucks gained a trade exception for $3.48 million, i.e., the difference in salaries between Monroe ($17.88M) and Bledsoe ($14.5M) plus $100,000. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(ii). That exception remained available through this past summer and into the 2018-19 season, as the Bucks operated over the salary cap and thus did not need to renounce it. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(m). That $3.48M trade exception would expire by rule on the same date the following year (November 7, 2018).
- On October 15, 2018, just a few weeks before the Monroe exception was set to expire, the Bucks used that trade exception to complete another trade with the Wizards. The Bucks acquired Jodie Meeks ($3.29M, narrowly within the $3.48M limit) and cash to help the Wizards avoid the luxury tax. In that trade, the Wizards eased the restrictions on their 2020 second rounder sent in the Jared Dudley deal, making it top-45 protected. If the pick did not convey in 2020, it would convert into an unprotected 2022 second rounder. In essence, the Bucks turned a 2020 pick that was very unlikely to convey into a pick that quite possibly would convey in 2020 and otherwise they would receive two years later.
- A couple months thereafter, on December 7, 2018 (that date is very important(!) as explained later), the Bucks completed a deal for George Hill, sending a 1st round pick, a 2nd round pick, and bad contracts to Cleveland. The Bucks completed that trade not only to improve their bench with Hill but also largely to gain long-term salary relief which they’ll need in order to retain their non-Giannis core and stay under the tax.
- While the Bucks sought to reduce long-term payroll obligations in the 12/7/18 trade, they remained willing to take on salary for the current season. Thus, they contacted their recurring trade partner, the Wizards, again offering 2018-19 luxury tax relief in exchange for assets if the Wizards wanted to make it a 3-team deal. The Wizards gladly dealt Jason Smith ($5.45M) to the Bucks in exchange for Sam Dekker ($2.76M) from the Cavs, saving several million dollars and upgrading their team at the same time. In return, the Wizards eliminated the protections on the 2020 pick altogether (which probably felt like a token gesture at the time), while sending the Bucks an additional 2nd rounder in 2021 as well. The Bucks never could have traded Dekker straight-up for Smith in a two-team trade, because their salary disparity is too large. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(i) (limiting salary received for Dekker to $4.93M, or 175% of his salary plus $100,000).
- A day before the trade deadline, on February 6, 2019, the Bucks honored Thon Maker’s trade request, dealing him to Detroit for Stanley Johnson. Yet the teams refrained from reporting the deal to the league office right away, instead looking for opportunities to build on it as the deadline approached. See 2012 NBA By-Laws Section 4.02 (establishing procedures to effect a trade, most notably including a “Trade Call” with the league office).
On deadline day, February 7, the Bucks seized their opportunity, landing Mirotic in a 3-team trade with the Pistons and Pelicans. The Bucks acquired Niko in exchange for Jason Smith, Stanley Johnson, Washington’s unprotected 2020 and 2021 second rounders, Milwaukee’s own 2020 second rounder, and a top-55 protected 2019 pick from Denver (previously acquired for Roy Hibbert in 2017). This trade would not have been possible if Milwaukee had already reported the initial Thon Maker deal, as Stanley Johnson then could not have been traded in combination with another player for two months. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(iii) (two-month waiting period before aggregating an acquired player’s contract with another contract for trade purposes). The Bucks could trade Jason Smith in combination with another player on February 7 because they acquired him exactly two months prior.
(B) Why Milwaukee’s Trade Assets were Valuable and Necessary
Zach Lowe noted in his post-deadline column that the Sixers made a similar offer for Mirotic. The Sixers have compiled a bunch of second rounders from non-playoff teams, and they offered at least two of them for Niko as well, likely including one or both of the bottom-dwelling Knicks’ 2020 and 2021 picks.
As recently as three days before the trade deadline, it didn’t look like Milwaukee had the future draft assets to compete with an offer like that or to obtain any sort of impact player. Notably, the Bucks were prohibited from trading any of their own first round picks. This is due to the oft-cited “Stepien Rule,” whereby a team cannot be left without a first round selection in two consecutive future drafts. See 2012 NBA By-Laws Section 7.03. After dealing protected first rounders for Eric Bledsoe and George Hill, the Bucks had no more first round picks to trade. Their next available first rounder for trade purposes is their 2026 pick, which is just outside the allowable 7-year window for trading draft picks.
When the Bucks acquired Washington’s 2020 and 2021 second rounders, the picks did not appear to have much value, even by second round pick standards. The Wizards’ core of John Wall, Bradley Beal, and Otto Porter seemed less than championship-caliber but good enough to reliably get the Wizards a playoff spot. Under such circumstances, one would expect those picks to land in the 45-55 range.
Yet Washington’s future outlook changed drastically in the days immediately leading up to the trade deadline. On February 5, we learned that John Wall—already out for the season due to a heel injury—had ruptured his Achilles when he slipped and fell at home. That new injury would keep him out of action not only for this season but also for most if not all of next season too. That’s 35% of the salary cap for no production. Late the following day, a.k.a. trade deadline eve, the Wizards decided it was time to give up on the existing core and clear up their cap situation. They traded Otto Porter for lesser expiring contracts, leaving them with Bradley Beal as their only healthy rotation player under contract next year, yet with no substantial cap space to improve the roster given the John Wall, Ian Mahinmi, and Dwight Howard contracts.
Suddenly, on deadline day, the Wizards looked like arguably the league’s most hopeless team for the 2019-20 season. While the Knicks had a couple paths to respectability or even contention, with a likely top pick and 2 max salary slots, the Wizards were stuck with an injured and ineffective roster outside Bradley Beal and minimal resources to make things better.
Washington’s unprotected 2020 and 2021 second round picks, which didn’t seem all that noteworthy a few days prior, had become the most desirable second rounders on the market.
Further, Jason Smith’s expiring contract wound up being exactly what the Bucks needed to pull off a trade for a relatively high-salaried player like Mirotic under the CBA rules. To deal for Niko and his $12.5M salary, Milwaukee had to send out at least $7.5M in player salary. If they hadn’t acquired Smith at least two months before the deadline, this would’ve been extremely difficult. New Orleans likely wouldn’t have accepted Ersan Ilyasova’s long-term, $7M/year contract, and he’s part of Milwaukee’s rotation anyway. To reach the necessary salary, the Bucks would’ve needed to include at least one promising young player like DJ Wilson or Donte DiVincenzo rather than merely expiring contract filler.
In short, everything came together to enable Milwaukee to trade for Niko on February 7, and the deal wouldn’t have worked even a day earlier.
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