I remember almost none of what I learned back then.  One thing I do recall, however, is that an option is “in the money” when there’s a benefit to exercising it—when it allows you to buy something for less than it’s worth or sell something for more than it’s worth [buy low! sell high!]—and “out of the money” otherwise.

What does that have to do with Utah’s ongoing rebuilding efforts?  A lot, actually.  Like most teams in their situation, the Jazz are largely focused on acquiring draft assets, including both draft picks and the right to swap draft picks (“pick swaps”), in return for their stars and veteran role players. 

A pick swap is essentially an option.  It’s worth exercising, or “in the money,” if the pick you have the right to take from another team is better than the pick you’d be sending back. 

As a general rule, the expected value of each pick swap is very low.  The team trading away an All-NBA player, All-Star, or even a solid starter or 6^th man for draft assets typically projects to be out of the playoffs and drafting in the lottery for at least a few years, whereas the team getting any of those players is usually a playoff team—perhaps a title contender—with a pick projected somewhere in the 20-30 range.

As a result, most pick swaps aren’t exercised.  They project to be “out of the money,” often by a significant margin.  A recent analysis found that 60% of pick swaps have been entirely worthless and never conveyed, with upcoming swaps likely to bring that number higher. 

For example, in the 2023 draft OKC has the right to swap picks with the Clippers as a result of trading away Paul George three years ago.  By the odds I’ve seen, the Clippers were initially pegged to win 27 more games than OKC this year (52.5 vs 25.5 O/U), and that spread has grown larger following the news of Chet Holmgren’s season-ending foot injury.  There is almost no chance that OKC will be swapping those picks.

In contrast, the Jazz have a unique opportunity.  Thanks to the Rudy Gobert, Donovan Mitchell, and Royce O’Neale trades, Utah already has a large collection of picks from other teams that are expected to land toward the bottom of the first round, and those picks can be swapped just as easily as Utah’s own first rounders. 

The Jazz can therefore generate some significant expected value by obtaining the option to swap picks in 2023, 2025, 2027, or 2029—all years when they have 3 first round picks at their disposal.  Those swaps would be far more likely than most to land “in the money” and be worth exercising.

While one or two of those swaps may amount to nothing, I think the Jazz would be wise to prioritize lightly-protected pick swaps over heavily-protected or otherwise very late first rounders (i.e., what trading a good role player typically gets you) given their situation. 

That maximizes the chances of Utah landing lottery picks, and especially high-lottery picks, which is what they really want as a rebuilding team—even though they’ll gain fewer picks this way. 

To illustrate why Utah should prioritize quality over quantity in the draft at this point in the rebuild, let’s turn back to OKC.  The Thunder have hoarded picks, and lately it’s become particularly evident that this strategy is likely to bleed value on the back end because the NBA’s 15-man roster limit remains the same regardless of whether you have 5 picks in the draft or zero.  You can’t keep using 4-5 picks per draft for long before you face severely diminishing returns or it becomes counterproductive.

This summer OKC wound up (i) dealing 3 protected first rounders for a single pick that wasn’t even in the top 10, (ii) giving up a late 1^st rounder in this draft plus taking on a bunch of dead money for a protected future pick likely to also end up in the latter part of the first round, and (iii) waiving Isaiah Roby to make roster space despite Roby being a cheap and fairly promising 24-year-old stretch 4/5.  Though sub-optimal, each of those moves is defensible given the roster crunch and the fact that no amount of late first rounders and second rounders can be traded for a high-lottery pick or foundational player.

Pick swaps alleviate the roster crunch issue by delivering better picks as opposed to more picks.  You’d still rather have the pick outright all else being equal, but by replacing the pick with a couple swaps you can offer much more upside to both parties. 

The benefits to the team trading away pick swaps are three-fold:

1. No net loss of picks
2. The swaps may result in little to nothing actually given up, and it’s largely within your control by being good (as opposed to the perverse incentive to tank associated with giving up protected picks)
3. It affords you far more flexibility than trading away a pick, especially a protected pick

That third point is why I think pick swaps will continue to become more prevalent.  Let’s say you deal a lottery-protected pick in 2023, becoming top-12 protected in 2024, then top-10 in 2025 and top-8 in 2026, otherwise converting to 2^nd rounders in 2026 and 2027—a fairly common type of trade these days.  You’re then hamstrung in being able to make further trades due to the Stepien Rule, which prohibits dealing yourself out of the 1^st round of consecutive future drafts.  You can’t trade a 1^st rounder outright until 2028, and combined with the conditional 2^nd rounders, that’s 7 picks you can’t trade just because you dealt a single protected pick.

In contrast, you can trade your first rounder the year before or year after you gave up swap rights.  You can even trade your first rounder THE SAME YEAR you gave up swap rights, with the understanding that the pick you’re giving up will be the lesser of your own pick and the pick that can be swapped for it.

For a team that either has already traded away first round picks or one that’s trying to maintain the flexibility to deal those picks in order to pull off something bigger, pick swaps are especially useful.

Without further ado, here are some deals involving pick swaps that I’d be looking to make in Utah’s position:

(1) Jordan Clarkson to the Sacramento Kings for Richaun Holmes and pick swaps in 2023 and 2025

Following the Sabonis/Haliburton trade, the Kings played Sabonis exclusively at center and relegated Holmes to a low-minute bench role.  Holmes has been an averageish starter for a few years and has a reasonable contract, but center is the deepest position in the league and the Kings have plenty of adequate backups.  They’re looking to deal him as a result, and they’ve been mentioned among the teams interested in Jordan Clarkson.

Clarkson appears to be the most in-demand of Utah’s veteran role players because he’s very good in his sparkplug 6^th man role and his salary is much easier to match than Conley or Bogdanovic.  I’m sure the Jazz could get a first rounder from a contender, but I think they’d be better off with a couple odd-year swaps from a middling team instead. 

I have to believe that any 2023 swap would be at least top-2 protected because no team wants to face the possibility of losing Victor Wembanyama or Scoot Henderson in exchange for a 30-year-old role player, but I think that the Kings would agree to very light protections here (top-2? top-4?) as they make a concerted playoff push. If either of the swaps falls into the protected range, then the Kings would add an unprotected 2027 swap. 

(2) Bojan Bogdanovic to the New York Knicks for Evan Fournier, Utah’s 2024 2^nd rounder [previously traded to NYK], and pick swaps in 2023 and 2025

We all know that the Donovan Mitchell trade talks with the Knicks fell through after endless speculation that the deal was bound to happen, yet the Knicks are still often mentioned as a suitor for Bogdanovic.  They could use his outside shooting in a frontcourt rotation that is very much lacking in that regard.

Fournier never seemed to fit well last year, and the Knicks would also prefer Bojan’s short-term contract as they try to position themselves for a mid-season trade or free agency next summer.

I think there’s somewhat less of a market for Bojanovic than Clarkson because his larger cap figure ($19.6M versus $13.3M) makes salary matching more of a challenge, so let’s say that the Knicks’ pick swaps are top-5 protected and remain top-5 protected in 2027 and 2029, as applicable, if any fall into the protected range and a replacement swap needs to be added. 

The Jazz can expect to be bad for at least the next 2 years, giving them all the more reason to want their 2024 2^nd round pick back.  High second-round picks tend to have a decent chance of sticking in the league.  Utah also currently only has 1 pick in the 2024 draft, which could conceivably be the draft where the entry age drops from 19 to 18 and the draft pool is larger.

It also makes a lot of sense to combine these two trades:

Utah would then receive the 3 most favorable picks out of (i) their own, NYK, SAC, MIN, and PHI (or BRK if lower) in 2023 and (ii) their own, NYK, SAC, MIN, and CLE in 2025, with the Knicks receiving the 4^th best pick and the Kings receiving the least favorable pick.  The Jazz can also send Leandro Bolmaro to either the Kings or Knicks, as they each have an open roster spot for him and Utah doesn’t.  Either team can add him while keeping the trade legal.

(3) Mike Conley and Rudy Gay to the Los Angeles Clippers for Marcus Morris, Reggie Jackson, and pick swaps in 2027 and 2029

I doubt there are many teams interested in Conley due to his age and salary, though the Clippers are an obvious match.  They want to win NOW, and they don’t have a point guard on the roster who’s a reliable shooter or starting-caliber player at this stage in his career.  Conley fills that void.

In each of the past 2 seasons, Conley has hit 40%+ from 3 on high volume, to go along with a 3:1 AST/TO ratio and roughly 7 assists per 36 minutes.  Statistically he remains a top-10 point guard or close to it, whereas Reggie Jackson was woefully inefficient last year and John Wall has missed 2 of the last 3 seasons and wasn’t near Conley’s level the year that he played.

I view the Marcus Morris for Rudy Gay part of the trade to be a mild positive for the Clippers as well.  With Kawhi Leonard expected to be healthy entering the season, there shouldn’t be many guaranteed minutes for Morris despite him starting every game last year.  He should be behind not only Kawhi but also Paul George and probably each of Robert Covington, Terance Mann, and Nic Batum in the battle for minutes at forward.  His volume scoring is less important in lineups alongside Kawhi, Paul George, and Norman Powell, and he offers less in other areas of the game than the alternatives while being paid the most, with $33.5M guaranteed over the next 2 years.

Rudy Gay has more utility as a small-ball center than Morris.  He has longer arms and is a superior rebounder and rim protector, while spacing the floor in much the same way.  Most of the advanced stats peg Rudy Gay as the better player overall, contributing to the assessment that the Clippers would benefit on both ends and gain several wins from the deal.

The Clippers don’t have any 1^st round picks to trade or swap until 2027.  They owe the Thunder their 1^st rounders in 2024 and 2026 plus swap rights in 2023 and 2025, but that isn’t much of a concern for the Jazz. 

Utah can get pick swaps in 2027 and 2029, leaving the Clippers the ability to deal their 2028 pick to add one more piece at the deadline if need be. 

Those swaps could be quite valuable, and in my opinion are much more likely to convey than the 2026 Wolves swap or the 2028 Cavs swap that the Jazz received in their prior deals.  While the Clippers are a legitimate contender if healthy, they’re also one of the league’s oldest teams.  Both of their stars are in their 30s and have had persistent injury concerns, making it well within the realm of possibility that the Clippers will be a lottery team a handful of seasons from now.  In contrast, the Cavs and Wolves have multiple young stars who are under team control through those swap years.

The key for Utah is increasing the pathways to getting top picks, or to borrow another term from the finance world, it’s diversification.  They want to control the future picks of as many teams as possible, increasing the likelihood that one or two of them will bottom out and give the Jazz the lottery picks they covet.  They don’t care if those top picks come from the Wolves, Cavs, or some third, fourth, or fifth team. 

If the Jazz really want to commit to this strategy, they could put their young role players on the block as well and deal Jarred Vanderbilt and Malik Beasley to Miami for Duncan Robinson, an unprotected 2028 pick, and swap rights in 2027 and/or 2029.  Following the loss of PJ Tucker, Miami doesn’t have a natural power forward on the roster unless you count Udonis Haslem (and you shouldn’t).  Vanderbilt and Beasley would be fun additions that could put the Heat over the top, with the added quirk that it would be the third time they’ve been traded together.  Miami has been rumored to have Duncan Robinson and his large long-term contract on the block for months now.

Then the Jazz would control multiple unprotected or lightly protected picks, including swap rights, from up to six different teams other than themselves: the Wolves, Cavs, Kings, Knicks, Clippers, and Heat. 

And those draft picks will supplement whatever high lottery picks the Jazz get from their own performance in the aftermath of this summer’s tear down, which can’t be overlooked.  After trading away both their stars and their best role players, the Jazz should have about as good a chance as any team at landing a franchise cornerstone with their own pick in the near future. 

You put together all those pathways to getting top picks, and that’s how the Jazz are most likely to find the players they need to become a real championship contender.

Outgoing:  Patrick Williams, Coby White, Marko Simonovic, #18, 2023 POR 1^st rounder (lottery-protected)

Incoming: Jakob Poeltl, PJ Washington, Tari Eason/#12, [rights to] Vasilije Micic, 2025 PHI 1^st rounder (top-6 protected), 2025 CHI 1^st & 2^nd rounders

2022-23 Roster

With decent health, I expect this roster to be much more competitive against the league’s best teams than last year’s version, which was tied for the East’s best record at the All-Star break but notoriously went 3-25 against the top-4 seeds (playoffs included).  I want to stagger Poeltl and Vucevic, though I think they can play together at least a handful of minutes a game against bench units.  Hopefully Vucevic can feast against backups much in the way that Kevin Love did last season and experience a similar revival.  While I looked for a Vucevic trade to add shooting / draft assets, when none presented itself I decided to hang onto him.  I’d rather try him off the bench than move him for next to nothing.

Transactions: Building This Bulls Roster

I made three trades in the mock draft. First, I traded a future 1st rounder for PJ Washington. Then, I traded Coby White, Simonovic, and #18 to move up to #12 (Eason) and get the rights to Micic and a future pick. Finally, I traded Patrick Williams for Jakob Poeltl and picks. I’ll go through each of those transactions.

(1) Traded Blazers’ 2023 1st round pick (lottery protected in 2023 & thereafter) to Charlotte for PJ Washington [using Daniel Theis trade exception]

Heading into last year’s trade deadline, I wrote about why PJ Washington was my top realistic trade target for the Bulls.  Here’s a quick recap:

• High-volume, high-efficiency outside shooter with deep range, joining a team that ranked last in 3-point attempt rate.  He should open up the court far more than last season’s primary options at the 4.  Javonte Green, Derrick Jones Jr., and Patrick Williams each averaged just three 3-point attempts per 100 possessions, with more than half of them collectively from the corners.  PJ averaged 8.2 per 100 possessions, with 3/4 of them coming from above the break.
• Excellent ball-handler and passer relative to his position, enabling the Bulls to run all the sets and actions they use with Vucevic and perhaps more.
• Length (7’2.25” wingspan, 8’10.5” standing reach) and lateral quickness make him an extremely versatile defender in terms of switching and executing different schemes and coverages, which is especially useful in the playoffs.

I also find that PJ Washington is an unusually bad fit for the Hornets.  He’s best as a connective player who can handle the ball regularly and execute team defensive schemes with his quickness, switchability, and awareness.  With LaMelo dominating the ball and Miles Bridges as the regular PF, the Hornets need PJ to be more of a play finisher on offense and a rim protector on defense, and those just aren’t his strengths.  I think he’d fit much better with Lonzo and the Bulls.

(2) Traded Coby White, #18, Marko Simonovic to OKC for #12 (Tari Eason), Sixers’ 2025 1st round pick (lightly protected as per Horford trade), rights to Vasilije Micic

Here is my preferred approach to this year’s draft, for any team:

• If you have a high lottery pick -> trade down to the late lottery, draft Tari Eason
• If you have a late lottery pick -> draft Tari Eason
• If you have mid- to late 1^st round pick -> trade up to the late lottery, draft Tari Eason

Yeah it’s simplistic, but I think it works.  I tend to have fairly idiosyncratic draft rankings, and this year is no exception.  My biggest deviation from the consensus is that I have Eason in the very top tier of prospects.    

Eason has ideal size and athleticism for a combo forward, with a 7’2” wingspan and 8’11.5” standing reach, while already possessing outlier strength.  He was arguably the NCAA’s most disruptive defender last year, as his length, quick feet, quick/massive hands, and outstanding anticipation and explosiveness allowed him to intercept passes, snatch the ball away on live dribbles, and pile up blocks as a help defender and in transition. 

Offensively, Eason has shown rapid development in two years of college, including dramatic improvements in free throw shooting, 3-point shooting, creating his own shot, and getting to the free throw line.  Despite coming off the bench and playing just 24 minutes a game, Eason ranked 3^rd in the SEC in free throw attempts while making 80% of them.  Down the stretch he was automatic at the line, with games of 10-10, 9-9, and 7-7(x2) in his last 6 games (90% overall). 

There are real concerns with Eason, but I think they’re substantially overblown.  He has funky shooting mechanics on his jumper, with a release point just above his right shoulder, and he’s also very right-hand dominant as a ball-handler and finisher.  My view is that shooting mechanics and handle are among the areas most susceptible to improvement as a pro, especially when you’re dealing with someone exhibiting an extreme motor and rapid gains in skill development like Eason.  He was ruthlessly effective even with those flaws, scoring an absurd 40 points per 100 possessions in the SEC on much higher efficiency than most other draft prospects apart from the true bigs.

The other flaws are all somewhat related: he can play out of control at times, he has a poor A/TO ratio, and he commits fouls at a high rate.  This mostly stems from trying to do too much, and I strongly prefer players who are hyperactive and could benefit from dialing it back a bit as opposed to those who are overly passive.  In this respect, he’s the opposite of Patrick Williams.  And I don’t subscribe to the idea that committing lots of fouls is a red flag; several of the league’s best defenders had similar or even higher foul rates in college, including Draymond Green, Joel Embiid, and reigning rookie standout Herb Jones.

I see Eason as the kind of player who can really elevate a team’s title chances if he pans out.  Both statistically and stylistically, one of Eason’s most similar prospects is Shawn Marion.  Certainly Marion is among the highest of Eason’s high-end outcomes, but even a lesser version is a player who holds value regardless of the roster construction or style of play. 

Micic is someone who’s likely worth a lot more to the Bulls than the Thunder.  He’s arguably the best offensive player not currently in the NBA, as he’s been at or near the top of the EuroLeague in scoring, assists, 3s, and free throws in each of the past two seasons.  Micic has indicated that he’s interested in making the jump to the NBA, but only to play a significant role on one of his preferred teams.  The Bulls have been linked to him, and despite holding his rights, the Thunder have not.  By dealing Coby White, the Bulls open up a clear role for Micic as the backup point guard behind an injury-prone (and currently injured) starter in Lonzo Ball.  That seems like a role Micic would be eager to play if the money is right, and the Bulls should be willing to use the taxpayer-MLE on him provided that their frontcourt is mostly set.

(3) Traded Patrick Williams to Spurs for Jakob Poeltl, Bulls’ 2025 1st round pick (protected as per DeRozan S+T), Bulls’ 2025 2nd round pick

I’m lower than most Bulls’ fans on Patrick Williams.  While I’ve been pleasantly surprised by his jumper, I just don’t see the defensive potential the team was expecting when he was drafted.  His feet and reactions look slow to me, and he drifts through games way too much without making the sort of effort plays I’d like to see (rebounding / boxing out, setting screens, helping on D).  With PJ Washington and Tari Eason on board to cover most minutes at the 4 now and especially in future years, I can feel good about moving Patrick Williams to another team that values him more highly.

Enter the Spurs and Jakob Poeltl to fill the rim protection void.  Poeltl isn’t Gobert in that regard, but he’s solidly in the next, borderline-elite tier.  For the past 3 years on average, opponents are shooting 53.7% within 6 feet when Poeltl’s around, 9.2% worse than they shoot otherwise.  In comparison, opponents are shooting 61.6% within 6 feet when Vucevic is around the rim, just 1.7% worse than they shoot otherwise over that same span.  Poeltl is more coordinated, gets up off the ground much more readily, and does a better job of staying vertical, upright, and in position to contest.

Compared to Gobert as a trade target, Poeltl is a better passer and ball-handler, about 3.5 years younger, and likely to cost roughly half as much going forward.  Poeltl is slated to be an unrestricted free agent after this season, though I would make every effort to keep him and let Vucevic seek a larger role elsewhere.

That’s it for my mock draft and offseason. Now it’s time to sit back and see what the Bulls actually do tonight.

For those interested, the full mock draft results can be found here.

More than anything else, I’d say that the Bulls need (i) a starting-caliber 4 who can match up against some of the bigger and stronger front lines, and (ii) another two-way player off the bench, preferably a high-usage type who can defend multiple positions. 

That need for a starting 4 is no secret.  Javonte Green admirably has taken on that responsibility most of the year, even though he’s 6’4” and much more comfortable defending point guards than conventional power forwards.  The Bulls have struggled and often failed to contain big and skilled 4s like Domantas Sabonis, Evan Mobley, and Julius Randle.  Giannis is another matter entirely and needs to be guarded at the team level more than the individual level, but at a minimum you want someone who can bother him a bit until help arrives.

The Bulls’ bench is fun albeit full of one-way players.  Derrick Jones Jr., Javonte Green [included with the bench presuming the Bulls trade for a new starter], Tony Bradley, Troy Brown, and Ayo Dosunmu are all solid defenders but very low-usage and also don’t really create for others.  They get their points primarily either in transition or when the defense ignores or loses track of them.  

On the flip side, while I’ve been encouraged by Coby White’s recent production, the defensive concerns shouldn’t be ignored.  He’ll put in effort on that end, and he’s been more engaged and effective lately than ever before, but with his 6’5” wingspan, 8’1.5” standing reach, and lack of strength or high-level awareness, he’ll likely always struggle to navigate screens and avoid getting picked on against better competition.  His hot streak has come against lesser teams missing key players, especially on the perimeter. 

The Bulls’ bench can get the job done in the regular season, but I’m not convinced that any of those guys should get extended minutes in the postseason barring a particularly favorable matchup.  In the playoffs, weaknesses tend to be exposed and it’s increasingly important for role players to bring value on both ends.

With that said, here are my favorite trade targets, from least to most desirable:

Alec Burks

Burks is on the older side (30) though the past couple years have been the most productive of his career.  He’s traded in some drives and mid-range pullups for 3s, while also becoming steadier as a distributor.

What stands out most about Burks is his versatility.  He can serve as the primary ball-handler, bringing the ball up the floor and initiating sets like he did Tuesday night with Kemba Walker and Derrick Rose both unavailable.  He can be a defensive stopper, like the previous game when he came off the bench to slow down Scottie Barnes and Pascal Siakam, getting five steals off of the two of them combined.  Or he can even be a primary scorer, like last week when he scored 34 points in 27 minutes, mostly via catch-and-shoot 3s, attacking closeouts, and finding openings while running pick and roll. 

While Burks doesn’t generate much separation off the dribble and lacks the explosiveness to finish in traffic, he overcomes those issues through craftiness as a ball-handler and outside shooting proficiency.  He scores in a variety of ways, rating in the 90^th percentile or higher on handoffs each of the past 3 years (typically 10% of offense), and also roughly the 90^th percentile on isolations (7% of offense), 75^th percentile on spot ups and 70^th percentile as a pick and roll ball-handler since joining the Knicks (each 1/3 of his offense). 

He does an excellent job of manipulating defenders while running pick and roll, keeping them at arms’ length and using misdirection and hesitation dribbles to set up 3s and lobs, get to the free throw line, and maintain an unusually low turnover rate.  Despite acting much more as a wing than a point guard throughout his career, he’s very patient in letting plays develop, setting up entry passes and finding the right angles to do so.

Though he’s just one inch taller than Coby White, Burks plays much bigger.  His wingspan is 5 inches longer, his standing reach is 6 inches higher, and he’s 20 pounds heavier.  Burks has found success in recent years acting effectively as the small forward in three-guard lineups, and if paired with Zach LaVine or DeMar DeRozan, he could reliably defend the more threatening opposing wing. 

The Bulls could trade for Burks and his $9.5M salary in a number of ways.  It could be as simple as a Derrick Jones Jr. swap provided that the Bulls have otherwise picked up a starting 4.  The Knicks are undoubtedly looking to shake up their rotation and could use a defensive-minded combo forward like DJJ.  The Bulls could also match salary through a 2-for-1 deal, like Troy Brown and Tony Bradley for Burks, to name one possibility.

If the trade were expanded, it’s worth noting that the Knicks have a couple extra 1^st rounders and some intriguing young players that could be routed to a rebuilding team, with the Knicks adding a bigger piece (CJ McCollum, Caris LeVert, Derrick White, etc.) to consolidate their guard rotation and the Bulls acquiring Burks as a result.

Brandon Clarke

Speaking of teams who could benefit from some consolidation, the Memphis Grizzlies have arguably the deepest roster in the league.  They’re so deep that they lost their best player and then didn’t trail a single second in their next 5 games, even with a couple other rotation players, including Brandon Clarke, missing some of those games as well.  When at reasonably full health, the Grizzlies have given Clarke just 15 minutes a night.  Lately, with Kyle Anderson and Xavier Tillman unable to play, he’s still only getting 20-25 mpg.  I’d like to see him in an expanded role elsewhere.  Why not Chicago?

Clarke’s offensive strengths and weaknesses are fairly easy to see.  On the plus side, he’s a brilliant finisher around the rim.  He’s bouncy and strong with tremendous body control, allowing him to adjust in mid-air and finish through, over, or around opposing rim protectors.  His 34” standing vertical and 40.5” max vertical were each the best among non-guards in his draft class.  Clarke is shooting 80% from 0-3 feet this year, and 76% for his career, with those shots around the rim making up nearly half of his total attempts. 

Clarke can extend a bit further out, displaying soft touch on floaters, hooks, and leaners in the paint, and as a result he’s shooting 70% on 2s as a whole, while rather remarkably attempting about 12 per 36 minutes.  That’s more than Nikola Vucevic!

Another clear strength is Clarke’s ball-handling and passing ability.  He’s quick and decisive with the ball in his hands, finding open shooters off the catch or even off the bounce after 1-3 dribbles.  Clarke isn’t the most creative or exciting passer but he’ll make smart reads and put the ball in the right spot.  He has a grand total of two bad pass turnovers and three lost ball turnovers against 33 assists this year.  With the way the Bulls like to operate using Vucevic as a hub, Clarke would give them another option when they share the court or allow them to play the same way when Vucevic is on the bench.

Now for the obvious offensive weakness: Clarke’s jumper is broken.  He tried to rework it after his rookie year and the results have been awful.  It lacks fluidity and balance, as he now brings the ball across his body as part of his standard shooting motion.  Clarke is 2-for-14 from beyond the arc this year and has attempted just 3 other shots outside 15 feet.

On the plus side, despite not being a threat to score outside the paint, Clarke does a good job of making opponents pay for leaving him open on the perimeter.  He’s one of the league’s most willing and active screeners, both on and off the ball.  He’ll set a screen, and if it doesn’t lead to anything he’ll immediately go back and set another one.  Sag off of him and your teammate might end up stuck on a screen giving up an open 3.

Clarke’s elite finishing ability means that he requires constant attention.  When he dives to the rim as the roll man, you need to tag him or it’s an easy lob for a dunk or layup.  If you lose sight of him in the corner, he’ll run the baseline, slip behind you and it’s the same outcome.  Or he’ll crash the offensive glass for a putback. 

His defensive role and value are a bit harder to peg.  I think Clarke’s somewhat less versatile on that end than you might expect.  He has short arms relative to his 6’8” height—his wingspan and standing reach are actually each less than Alec Burks—and he also has fairly stiff hips which hinder his lateral movement and recovery when he ventures out to the perimeter.  He’s best suited defending 4s, and beyond that it depends on matchups.  He can handle big wings, but not quick ones, plus undersized centers or those that struggle to capitalize on size mismatches. 

Clarke’s leaping ability and high energy level make him a solid rim protector despite those size limitations, though his need to jump in order to contest shots leaves him vulnerable to pump fakes.  By most measures he’s roughly a neutral defender overall.

I don’t see a two-team trade between the Grizzlies and Bulls being likely.  Rather, I envision the Grizzlies making a move to add to their core, dealing a collection of players and picks for someone like Jaylen Brown, Jayson Tatum, Ben Simmons, or Fred VanVleet, with the Bulls swooping in as the third team. 

I’ll use Fred VanVleet as an example, because a lineup of Ja, VanVleet, Bane, JJJ, and Adams would fit together pretty seamlessly in my view. 

In trading Patrick Williams and Troy Brown for Brandon Clarke and Dillon Brooks in this example, the Bulls would be leaning into their strengths stylistically.  Clarke is a bigger and more skilled version of Derrick Jones Jr., while Brooks could be described as a much less efficient DeMar DeRozan with better defense.  Brooks has been a regular starter on a good team for the past few years, and he’d join Caruso in playing big minutes off the bench.  Also note that any trade involving Patrick Williams will likely show the Bulls faring best from a team wins-added/lost perspective, but I wouldn’t put much stock in those numbers. 

PJ Washington

PJ Washington is my #1 target, as I absolutely love his fit with the Bulls.  Here’s why, and I’ll get into each of these a bit further below:

• He’s a high-volume, high-efficiency outside shooter joining a team that’s 29^th in 3-point attempt rate, which should open up the court for DeRozan, LaVine, and Vucevic more than someone who only shoots a decent percentage from the corners like the team’s current options at the 4. 
• Like Clarke, he’s another guy who excels as a ball-handler relative to his position, enabling the Bulls to run all the sets they use with Vucevic and perhaps more. 
• He’s an extremely versatile defender in terms of switching and executing different schemes and coverages, which is especially useful in the playoffs.
• He’s only 23 and has room to improve.

The first thing that jumps out about PJ is the development of his outside shot.  While he’s always been a threat beyond the arc, his volume has steadily increased and his shot profile become increasingly difficult to defend.  He’s improved from a standard “corner 3” specialist stretch big to one of the league’s best above-the-break shooters off the catch.  He’s hitting 43.3% on 7 attempts per 36, with only 15% of those attempts coming from the corners. 

In fact, the greater the distance, the better he’s been.  He’s shooting 45.5% above the break, and 18/32 (56.3%) from 26+ feet, at least a full step back behind the 3-point line.  Shooting from that distance makes closeouts all the more challenging, giving PJ more open looks and creating better opportunities for everyone to attack in space against an out-of-position defense.

One player who can take advantage of that attacking space is PJ himself.  He’s nimble and creative with the ball in his hands, more so than other smart-passing bigs like Vucevic and Clarke.  While Vucevic excels at passing from a stand-still position with his vision and decision-making, he’s less suited for passing on the move as the Bulls sometimes ask him to do.  That requires a mix of high-end coordination and processing speed that few players possess, but I think PJ has it.  He shows real playmaking flashes, like faking a dribble handoff at the 3-point line, spinning, and putting the ball on the floor in one fluid motion, then driving into the paint and kicking it out to the corner. 

Whereas Vucevic often looks uncomfortable catching the ball on the move in short-roll passing situations, leading to some clunky possessions, PJ moves and handles the ball more like a guard and can execute those sets more effectively.  From the time LaMelo was sidelined under COVID protocols to the time PJ entered COVID protocols himself, PJ had 26 assists to just 4 turnovers.  Depending on lineups, PJ sometimes even takes responsibility for bringing the ball up the court.

At 6’7” PJ is just one inch shorter than Clarke, though otherwise they couldn’t be much more different physically and athletically.  PJ is relatively ground-bound but has exceptionally long arms, with over a 7’2” wingspan and 8’11” standing reach.  That length allows him to contest shots without leaving his feet and defend much taller players.  His lateral movement is also a definite plus, making him one of the most switchable bigs in the league.  He can defend the perimeter for long stretches without help, and with his length and quickness to recover, he’s well suited to execute a variety of pick-and-roll coverages like blitzing and hedging.

That could give the Bulls another dimension defensively with PJ at the 5.  While those lineups in Charlotte have piled up points but hemorrhaged them on defense, I think the Bulls have the personnel to make it work on both ends.  Given that he’s somewhat undersized and doesn’t have a ton of lift, PJ tends to get more of his blocks on-the-ball by surprising opponents with his length, rather than as a help defender in the paint.  If you give ball-handlers a free run into the lane with only PJ between them and the hoop, it can look like a layup line at times. 

But with standout point-of-attack defenders like Caruso and Lonzo pressuring the ball and the ability to switch up and down the spectrum with not only those two but also Javonte, Derrick Jones Jr., and of course PJ, the Bulls can compensate for PJ’s weakness as a true rim protector and take better advantage of his strengths.  A lineup of PJ, Lonzo, Caruso, DJJ/Javonte, and either DeRozan or LaVine would present a tough matchup for anyone.

An important point here is that PJ is NOT a very good fit in Charlotte.  His style of play doesn’t mesh well with LaMelo Ball, who plays a more ball-dominant style and pairs best with rim-runners he can set up for easy buckets.  PJ has consistently been better both individually and in terms of team success when on the floor without LaMelo, when he can be more involved in the offense. 

Based on the lineup data at Basketball-Reference, the Hornets have been approximately -5 per 100 possessions with LaMelo and PJ sharing the court the past 2 years and +5 when PJ’s on the floor minus LaMelo.  The Hornets seem to recognize this, bringing PJ off the bench and instead starting Nick Richards when Plumlee was out, thereby staggering PJ and LaMelo regardless of who’s available. 

There are two other reasons why PJ doesn’t fit particularly well with the Hornets roster.  First, they’ve decided that Miles Bridges is best as a power forward pretty much exclusively, meaning that PJ only plays center when Bridges is on the floor.  I’d say that in most contexts PJ is more of a 4 than a 5. 

Second and relatedly, in the particular context of the Hornets, PJ is not what they need at the 5.  Their perimeter defense is poor.  LaMelo, Rozier, and Oubre gamble for steals and are frequently out of position, consistently falling short when it comes to cutting off dribble penetration, rotating, and frustrating entry passes.  The Hornets currently rank 29^th in opponent 2-point field goal percentage and overall effective field goal percentage.  They could really use a center that can wall off the paint and put a lid on the rim, and PJ Washington isn’t that guy.

There’s a straightforward framework for a deal here, with a rim protector going from a rebuilding team to Charlotte, PJ Washington to the Bulls, and Patrick Williams to that rebuilding team.  The most obvious candidate is Myles Turner, as I think the Pacers, Hornets, and Bulls each should approve of that deal in principle.  Salary-matching is the tricky part, given the disparity between Turner ($18M) and PJ ($4.2M). 

Here’s one version of the deal that I like, bringing in the Knicks to make it a 4-way trade:

The Hornets would send out Mason Plumlee and James Bouknight for salary-matching, while getting Miles McBride as a point-of-attack defender and one of their second round picks back to make up for that extra value lost.  Myles Turner becomes part of their long-term core and hopefully gives the defense the boost it needs to at least be decent.

The Pacers should be happy with the high-end potential of Patrick Williams and James Bouknight, even more so coupled with a first rounder and a couple solid veterans under contract beyond this year.  That’s a strong return for Myles Turner and Caris LeVert, each of whom could leave after next season, plus Jeremy Lamb and his expiring contract.  The Pacers would also save a bunch of money this year.

For the Knicks, they get that upgrade they’re looking for in LeVert, while also unloading Fournier’s contract that they almost certainly regret (except when he’s playing the Celtics at least) and sending out a couple excess picks to make it happen.  The rest of the deal for them is mostly just rearranging the pieces of a roster that hasn’t seemed to click except for all-bench units.

To be honest, I like the present and long-term fit of PJ and Burks so much for the Bulls that I wouldn’t mind also shipping out the Portland pick to make this happen.  I know a lot of Bulls fans would view Patrick Williams alone as an overpay and sending the pick on top of it as an extreme one, but a chance to contend doesn’t come along that often and I don’t see Williams as the sort of can’t-miss prospect for whom you’d give up a year or two of your potential window.  And there’s not much the Bulls can or would trade that has substantial value beyond Patrick Williams, especially with that protected Blazers pick losing value as Portland continues to struggle and Dame’s future becomes more and more uncertain.

This year I dialed up my efforts as GM of the Pelicans, in an attempt to reshape the roster around Zion and build a contender in the near future.  Here are the results:

Net Gains: Damian Lillard, Robert Covington, Chris Boucher, Eric Gordon, Isaiah Jackson (#23), Kessler Edwards (#24). Also drafted Aaron Henry (#35) and McKinley Wright IV (#53) with previously existing picks.

Net Losses: Brandon Ingram, Steven Adams, Eric Bledsoe, #10, #40, #43, LAL 2022 1^st rounder, NOP 1^st rounders in 2023, 2025, and 2027, NOP 2022 2^nd rounder

Following a disappointing season in which they went 31-41 and failed to qualify for the play-in, the Pelicans entered the summer with a talented though awkward-fitting roster and a stockpile of future picks from the Anthony Davis and Jrue Holiday trades.  

By the end of my mock draft, they’d added Damian Lillard—one of the league’s top offensive engines and a guy who complements Zion just about as well as possible on that end of the floor—plus three more veterans to further surround Zion with outside shooting.  Covington and Boucher should also improve the frontcourt defense, which was a glaring weakness last year. 

In the draft itself, the Pelicans added three defensive-minded prospects with differing skillsets: Isaiah Jackson (rim protection + finishing), Kessler Edwards (versatility + shooting), and Aaron Henry (point-of-attack defense + secondary creation).  I see reasonable paths to each of them having very productive NBA careers.  Finally, near the end of the draft I grabbed McKinley Wright, a developmental point guard on a two-way contract.

More details below. 

The Trades

Last year’s starting lineup of Bledsoe, Lonzo, Ingram, Zion, & Adams was a questionable fit on both ends. Despite lofty expectations, it outscored opponents by just 2 points per 100 possessions. On defense, a lack of quickness and activity, especially in the frontcourt, resulted in conceding far too many open looks. The Pelicans ranked 22nd defensively and were substantially worse with the starters on the floor.

Offensively the team was above average, though not to the extent you might expect with Zion shooting over 60%, another All-Star in Ingram, and the Pelicans leading the league in offensive rebounding.  Ingram has indeed become an outstanding mid-range scorer, but his style of play doesn’t tend to create the best scoring opportunities for others, particularly in a lineup lacking outside shooting.  New Orleans finished near the bottom of the league in both 3-point attempts and 3P%, making Zion’s staggering interior efficiency all the more remarkable given the poor spacing around him.

My plan for the offseason was to build a much more cohesive roster around Zion, starting with a more complementary 2nd star than Ingram.  

My #1 target was Damian Lillard, an elite outside shooter and playmaker who could help Zion become an even more dominant interior threat.  The Blazers weren’t interested in Ingram, however, indicating that they preferred top draft picks. 

That brings me to the first trade:

• NOP gets #2, #23, #24, Eric Gordon
• HOU gets Ingram, #35, Lakers 2022 1^st rounder (top 4 protected)

This was essentially the #2 pick for Ingram.  The Rockets didn’t have enough cap space for that, and I was able to snag another 1^st rounder by taking back Eric Gordon, whose 2 years and $38M left under contract is more than he’d get on the open market.  Along with gaining the #2 pick, I moved up from #35 to #23.  Finally, Houston preferred the uncertainty of the Lakers’ 2022 pick over keeping #24 this year, leaving me (at least temporarily) with 4 first rounders: #2, #10, #23, and #24.

A major side benefit of this deal is that it can be expanded to allow New Orleans to take on salary in an accompanying move.  That’s because Brandon Ingram ($29.5M) can be traded for players earning roughly twice as much as Eric Gordon ($18.2M) under the salary-matching rules.

Using that to my advantage, I then reached a deal in principle with Portland, getting both Lillard and Robert Covington at the steep price of the #2 and #10 picks, 1^st rounders in 2023, 2025, and 2027, Steven Adams, and Eric Bledsoe. 

The Raptors also wanted in on the deal, and the 3-team trade ended up as follows:

This seems like exactly what the Blazers would have wanted in a Lillard deal, nabbing 2 of the top 4 picks in what many viewed as a 4-player draft at the top, while saving a bunch of money in the process.  A rebuild centered on any two of Evan Mobley, Jalen Green, and Jalen Suggs is more exciting and an easier sell to the fanbase than trading Lillard for a fringe All-Star and uncertain future picks from a contender. 

That 3-team deal wouldn’t work under the cap on its own, but it does in combination with the earlier Houston trade.  Ingram, Bledsoe, and Adams account for nearly $65M in payroll this year, and they can collectively be traded for $81M under salary-matching principles.  Lillard, Covington, Gordon, and Boucher together will earn just under $78M this year.

I then circled back with the Rockets, and we agreed to amend our initial deal by replacing the #35 pick with picks #43 and #46 (from Toronto).  By submitting everything together as one massive, 4-team trade, the Pelicans could take on a bunch of salary and, at least in my opinion, drastically improve their roster.

Now that the trade mechanics and cap minutiae are out of the way, let’s talk about the fit.

Few players in the league have as much gravity as Damian Lillard or Zion Williamson, with Lillard drawing defenders away from the hoop and Zion making them collapse in on it.  

Lillard is the league’s most prolific scorer outside 30 feet.  No one made more 30-40 footers than Lillard last season (42), and over the past 3 years he’s made 110 such shots at 38% efficiency.  Trae Young ranks second over that span with 89, followed by Steph with 62 and no one else above 25.   

Meanwhile, Zion has established himself as the league’s most prolific scorer inside 3 feet.  He was the only player in the league to make 500+ shots inside 3 feet last season, and his nearly 17 ppg around the rim were 20% more than Giannis and 50% more than anyone else.

Surrounding Zion with elite outside shooting should make him even more unstoppable.  Last year the Blazers ranked 3rd in 3-point attempt rate and the Pelicans 3rd-from-the-bottom.  The Blazers were 6th in 3P% and the Pelicans 26th.  After replacing Ingram, Adams, and Bledsoe with Lillard, Covington, Boucher, and Gordon, New Orleans should vault up toward the top of the league in those areas.  Gordon in particular is another guy who confounds opponents with his deep range, as he doesn’t hesitate to take shots several feet beyond the arc.

Boucher and Covington space the floor while also protecting the rim.  Of all players who made at least 1.5 3s a game last year, they ranked #1 and #2 in blocks.  That combination of skills—outside shooting and rim protection—is what earned Kristaps Porzingis the original “unicorn” designation, and it’s what has made Brook Lopez such an exceptional fit in Milwaukee alongside Giannis.  Given the similarities between Giannis and Zion, Boucher and Covington should likewise be natural fits here. 

And Boucher isn’t just a great rim protector for a 3-point shooter; he’s one of the league’s foremost shot-blockers overall.  His 7.6% block percentage ranked 3^rd in the league and was roughly 3.5x any of the Pelicans’ starters last year.  Boucher’s extreme defensive activity is even more apparent from the fact that he ranked 5^th in the league in shots contested per game, including 7^th in contested 3-pointers per game.  He doesn’t simply sink toward the basket to pile up blocks.

I was more surprised to see that Covington also rates well ahead of any Pelicans starter as a shot-blocker.  That’s because blocking shots isn’t really Covington’s specialty.  He’s more of an all-around plus defender, particularly in terms of his versatility, positioning, aggressive help, and quick hands.  Along with the aforementioned blocks, Covington has ranked among the top 5 in steals each of the past 2 years, and last season he led the entire NBA in deflections, with 255.  His defensive wizardry has made him a plus/minus standout throughout his career, and it’s something I chronicled in my Robert Covington scouting report back in 2015 (observations #4 and #5).

Lillard’s defensive limitations are well-known, and while I think Zion will continue to improve on that end, he isn’t the type of player to anchor a defense right now.  That’s why I felt it was particularly important to bring in active help defenders like Covington and Boucher.  It also contributed to me picking defense-first players in the draft, as I do think that fit matters to some extent in making those selections. 

The Draft Picks

Isaiah Jackson (#23)

Very bouncy, long, & mobile dive man and rim protector. 

Jackson’s listed weaknesses are mostly positives in my view, e.g., that he was very aggressive and tried to force the issue on both ends, leading to some bad misses on self-created jumpers and runners, offensive fouls via charge and moving screens, and out-of-control closeouts and blocked-shot attempts.  Kentucky was a dysfunctional mess with awful guard play.  That Jackson relentlessly attempted to make up for his team’s shortcomings by creating much of his own offense and trying to be as disruptive as possible defensively should be points in his favor. 

He’s the sort of player who typically gets downgraded as “raw” and a “project big man” but really isn’t.  From Jackson’s identified weaknesses and the team context you’d think his numbers would be nothing special, but he was actually one of the most productive players in the SEC as a freshman, as well as Kentucky’s best player by a mile (30 PER and 63% TS in conference play, led the SEC in TRB%, BLK%, and DBPM). 

As almost exclusively a finisher rather than a shot creator at the next level, he very well could be one of the most NBA-ready players in the draft class in terms of carving out a role and having a positive impact.  His agility, motor, and leaping ability, including a staggeringly quick second jump, make him not only an imposing shot-blocker and offensive rebounder but also an inviting lob target and rim runner in transition. 

Damian Lillard has talked about how much he’d like to play with a “super-athletic and mobile big man,” and while Zion obviously fits that description, Isaiah Jackson is also about as mobile and athletic a big man as you’ll ever find.

Kessler Edwards (#24)

Movement shooter with size and defensive versatility, which is a strong foundation to become a useful role player. 

Some question whether his shot will hold up, given his unconventional form with a pronounced dip, forward lean, and split-legged landing, though he squares up to the target and it’s been repeatable and reliable (40% from downtown over the course of his 3 years at Pepperdine, on relatively high volume).  His 88% shooting from the free throw line this year is also reassuring in that regard.  Edwards shouldn’t be expected to create off the dribble, as his handle is weak and he moves mostly in a straight line aside from the occasional spin move.  Fortunately, this team has enough shot creation to accommodate some dependent, catch-and-shoot players.

Edwards has the potential to be quite an effective and switchable defender.  His long arms (8’10” standing reach) and excellent instincts/timing defensively allowed him to lead the WCC in blocks despite being 6’8” and not an explosive leaper.  He can hang with most guards as well, with quick feet for his size and smart positioning.  He’s not an especially flashy or aggressive individual defender but executes team concepts and puts himself in the right spots. 

Also notable that he’s young for a junior.  Edwards was 20 at draft time, like a few of the acclaimed freshmen (including Mobley and Jalen Green).

Aaron Henry (#35)

One of the best point-of-attack defenders in the draft, with size and strength to take on wings rather than just smaller guards.  An outstanding mid-range floater paired with his craftiness and vision off the dribble gives him a chance to add value as a secondary creator.  Cracking an NBA rotation is likely contingent on improving his subpar outside jumper.  Its slow and out-of-balance form needs to be reworked.  Henry should spend time in the G-League as a result, but I’d sign him to a multi-year deal.

I found this to be a very deep draft for wings, with little separation from the late lottery onward.  That resulted in the first-round wings largely feeling like overdrafts and some really intriguing players going undrafted, Henry included.  There were some rumblings of character concerns to account for his slide but no reports of any off-court issues and really nothing specific at all to back it up.  He didn’t make the leap as a sophomore that many expected, yet last year as a junior he led the team in virtually every category as a point forward and defensive stopper.

He has much in common with Naji Marshall, another undrafted wing who found some success in New Orleans last year as a rookie. 

McKinley Wright IV (#53)

Four-year starter at point guard (Colorado) known for competitiveness & positive attitude.  Small but strong (6’0” with 6’5” wingspan, 192 pounds).  Understands how to execute pick-and-roll, helping him to a nearly 3:1 AST/TO ratio last year.  Not much of a scorer apart from a nice mid-range jumper and floater, just 33% from deep on middling volume for his career.  An above-average defender in college with quick feet and tremendous effort, though limited by size.  Should be a good practice player on a two-way contract, with the potential for some reserve minutes down the line.

The Free Agents

This really boils down to a single free agent:  Lonzo Ball.  Unlike the actual Pelicans, I am willing to pay whatever price is necessary to retain him.  By my calculations, even after all the salary added in trade, the mock Pelicans can afford to pay Lonzo up to $26-27 million this year and stay under the luxury tax, which is $1-2M below his maximum salary and $7-8M above the offer sheet he signed with the Bulls. 

I am higher on Lonzo than the consensus, even more so in the context of this mock Pelicans roster, but I’ll willingly acknowledge his flaws.  Ball suffers from a version of Ben Simmons’s main issue: he’s not enough of a shooter/scorer off the dribble to be an optimal primary ball-handler in the half court. His assisted v. unassisted numbers are those of a wing, not a point guard.

Lonzo’s great as a distributor in transition or if he can get downhill against a scattered defense, but you can’t just run pick-and-roll with him, or give him the ball and clear out, and expect success.  In other words, Lonzo is not an advantage creator like a Doncic, Trae Young, or even his brother LaMelo.  He can’t bend a defense, beat his man off the dribble, or command a double team to generate openings for teammates in a half court set. 

Although he doesn’t create advantages like an optimal ball-dominant player, Lonzo has a knack for building on existing advantages.  He does this by seeing the whole court, making the right read, and putting the ball where it needs to go in order to keep the defense scrambling and get easy buckets.  Lonzo similarly excels at moving off-the-ball, particularly in terms of relocating along the perimeter.  If his man is even slightly distracted, you can count on Lonzo to find an open spot as an outlet for a pass and then make the most of that opportunity on the catch, either with his much-improved jumper or by attacking an overextended defense.

These qualities make Lonzo an ideal fit alongside a dynamic on-ball perimeter threat.  I believe that adding Lillard would make Lonzo substantially more effective offensively, as it gives him more opportunities to catch the ball in favorable situations, where his skill set is most valuable.   

Lonzo uses his awareness and anticipation to make plays on the defensive end of the floor as well, ranking in the top 20 in steal percentage and steals per game.  He’s not as strong, versatile, or consistently locked-in as Covington—and he only grades out as slightly above average rather than a notably positive defender as a result—but I think that Lonzo and Covington in tandem could really elevate the team’s defensive intelligence and cut down on the easy looks the Pelicans allowed last year, particularly in combination with a mobile rim protector like Boucher.

As for the team’s other significant free agent, Josh Hart, I’d let him go if the offseason plays out this way.  He almost certainly can’t be kept while staying under the luxury tax, and I have to think that staying under the tax is a priority for a smaller market team like New Orleans.  There’s no need to renounce his rights, however, and maybe we can work out a sign-and-trade with him and a new team to grab a 2^nd round pick or trade exception in return. 

Starting lineup: Lillard / Lonzo / Covington / Zion / Boucher

Bench rotation: Kira Lewis, Gordon, NAW, Naji, Isaiah Jackson, Jaxson Hayes

Deep bench: Kessler Edwards, Aaron Henry + minimum-salaried vets

Two-Way: McKinley Wright

In the event that I couldn’t get Covington included in the Lillard deal, I’d bring back Hart to take his place.  Either way, the roster has enough skilled, reliable wings with Nickeil Alexander-Walker, Eric Gordon, and Naji Marshall all coming off the bench that the Pelicans can experiment with smaller lineups (Zion or Covington at center) and various combinations throughout the season.

I believe that this version of the Pelicans would join Brooklyn in the top tier of NBA offenses.  Lillard has led the Blazers to a top-3 Offensive Rating each of the past 3 seasons, and I’d argue that this team has more offensive firepower and top-end talent than any of those Portland rosters.  Just looking at some of the most trusted all-in-one metrics, Lillard ranks as the #1 offensive player in the league by some measures (DPM/DARKO, 3-year RAPM) and no worse than #3 by others (EPM, LEBRON, RAPTOR, BPM, 1- and 5-year RAPM).  Meanwhile, after just his 2^nd season, Zion isn’t too far behind as an elite offensive force (#9 BPM, #12 LEBRON, #17 EPM). 

When you start with the talent and inside/outside synergy of Zion and Dame and then add high-level shooters and a secondary creator/facilitator like Lonzo, it’s hard to imagine not having the league’s most potent offense or very close to it.  Zion’s too quick and agile for opposing bigs and too strong for opposing forwards, and it’ll be much more hazardous to double him with all that outside shooting around him.

The defensive questions are legitimate, though for reasons I’ve largely explained, I think this team is more likely to be decent as opposed to bad on that end.   Apart from the superstars, the roster is full of active help defenders and rim protectors.  

Defense is also much more scheme-dependent than offense.  With a mobile shot-blocker plus smart, energetic wings cutting off penetration and passing lanes, closing out on shooters, and funneling ball-handlers and slashers to spots where they’re least dangerous, I tend to think that you can overcome a subpar defender or two in the lineup.  Tom Thibodeau has essentially been proving that throughout his career.  Whether this group can execute such a scheme is an open question, though I think it stands a better chance of covering for Lillard on that end than the recent Portland teams.

Adam Silver recently made headlines by acknowledging that the league is looking more closely at the possibility of expansion.  This increased interest is likely fueled by the owners’ financial losses from the pandemic and the continued rise in team valuations, now exceeding $2 billion on average according to Forbes, creating the opportunity to quickly recoup those losses via franchise fees. 

A franchise fee is the amount that an ownership group pays the league for the privilege of obtaining a new team.  Unlike most other league revenues, franchise fees are explicitly carved out of the Basketball Related Income that needs to be shared roughly evenly with the players under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, meaning that the existing owners retain all of it [CBA Article VII, Section 1(a)(2)(iii)]. 

When the NBA expanded into Canada in the mid-90s, the fee required of those new ownership groups was $125 million – up from $32.5 million a handful of years prior.  In the 2000s, Charlotte got a new team for $300-350 million.  Now the league is optimistic that it can obtain more than $1 billion in awarding a new franchise.

By adding two franchises for $1 billion each, every one of the 30 existing ownership groups could receive nearly $70 million.  Bump that franchise fee up to $1.5 billion, and it’s $100 million per owner. That would go a long way toward offsetting any losses incurred in the 2019-20 and 2020-21 seasons. 

As for which cities would become the proud new homes of an NBA team, it is well-known that Seattle is at the top of the list.  Seattle has a long and successful history as an NBA market, and also is the largest US metropolitan area to not currently have a team in its vicinity, by both population and GDP.

The second market is up for debate, with many options floated at various times: Anaheim, Austin, Columbus, Kansas City, Las Vegas, Louisville, Mexico City, Montreal, Nashville, San Diego, San Jose, St. Louis, Vancouver, and Virginia Beach among them.   

A few of those options likely aren’t viable because existing owners would object, given their proximity.  The Lakers and Clippers wouldn’t want a team in Anaheim, and the same goes for the Warriors with San Jose and the Spurs with Austin.

Another concern is travel.  Over time it has become more apparent how increased travel has a negative impact on player health and the quality of play.  Ideally the new team will fit well within the geography of the league and its realignment, reducing rather than increasing in-season travel.  With that in mind – all else being equal – where’s the best location for the other expansion team, and what might the new conference and division structure look like?

Realignment

Here is a map of the current franchises sorted by division, courtesy of Maps on the Web:

There are a few ways in which it’s suboptimal.  Most glaringly, the Northwest Division is literally all over the map.  Portland is in the same division as Minnesota and Oklahoma City despite being roughly 1500 miles and two time zones away from either.  Further, Minnesota makes no sense in the Western Conference.  It is closer to EVERY team in the East’s Central Division than it is to ANY team in the West.  As a lesser concern, the Washington Wizards are in the same division as both Florida teams, which are the 2 most distant teams from Washington in the East.

For the purposes of expansion, the biggest takeaway from this map is that both expansion teams should be in the West.  That would enable Minnesota to move to the East, where it logically belongs. 

Following expansion, the NBA can adopt the NFL’s model of eight 4-team divisions and perhaps a somewhat less balanced schedule to reduce travel.  As you can see in the map below, the East could become very tightly organized from a divisional perspective, with almost every divisional opponent located within a few hundred miles of each other.  The single longest trip from one divisional opponent to another is Charlotte to Miami, which is roughly 650 miles and under a 2-hour flight each way.

Based on the map, Kansas City would be an ideal second expansion city.  It sits between Denver and Memphis and is also quite close to Oklahoma City (200 miles), effectively closing the loop on the least obvious division to sort out.  St. Louis or Nashville could occupy that same spot or be grouped with New Orleans and Houston in addition to Memphis.  In that scenario, Denver, OKC, Dallas, and San Antonio would be in the same division, and all divisional opponents would remain within 900 miles of each other.   

Las Vegas would also fit reasonably well as the second expansion team.  Vegas could join a division with the LA teams and most likely Phoenix, with Utah exiting that division to join Denver, OKC, and Dallas. 

Mexico City could work from a divisional perspective, grouped with San Antonio, Houston, and New Orleans; however, putting a team in Mexico City would present some strain on league travel as a whole compared to the other options above.  Situated approximately 700 miles south of San Antonio, Mexico City is 1500+ miles away from about 2/3 of the league and not particularly close to any existing team.

The Future Schedule

Adding two teams means changing the schedule.  I consider this an opportunity to take a fresh look at a regular season that’s remained largely the same for decades. 

No matter how you look at it, I think you reach the inescapable conclusion that there should be fewer regular season games.  Right now, star players often miss 5-10 games a year even when healthy, for what’s become known as “load management.”  And even when everyone plays, it is well chronicled that teams playing in back-to-back games, particularly with travel in between, perform notably worse than they do otherwise.  Each of these related issues has a negative effect on the product being sold, as fans can’t rely on seeing a team’s best performance when attending or watching a game.

Entering the bubble last season, there was some concern that the level of play would be poor following the long layoff and with the playoff spots largely determined.  Yet by consensus we saw the opposite – a higher level of play overall, with more movement and better shooting.  There are several theories for why this occurred, though I think the lack of back-to-back games and lack of travel certainly played a part.

So what does the optimal future schedule look like, taking into account quality of play, fairness, and the obvious desire to make as much money as possible?  Here are my suggestions:

Prioritize the calendar over the number of games

I have some reservations about the current season schedule.  I think the league and players were right to make every effort to start by Christmas, which is a huge date on the traditional league (TV) calendar, but wrong to try to squeeze as many games in as possible.  Particularly given the lack of fans this year, what matters most from a financial perspective is satisfying national TV contracts, not hosting games.  Cramming more games into the calendar following the minimal training camp and preseason, and absence of summer league, plainly will hurt the quality of play.  A week into the season, star players like Kevin Durant and Kyrie Irving already are taking games off, and we are seeing far more non-competitive games than usual. 

Of course, unlike expansion, scheduling is subject to collective bargaining and requires the agreement of both the owners and the players.  It may be difficult to get either side, let alone both, to agree that reducing the number of games is in their interests, but I firmly believe that the resulting superior product (with enhanced marketing opportunities) would enhance long-term profitability.  The NFL has the fewest games of any major sports league, yet it also produces the highest annual revenues and most valuable teams.

(a) Push Everything Back 5-6 Weeks on the Calendar

In recent years the NBA regular season + playoffs have run from mid- to late October through mid-June.  I think a late November or early December start and late July or early August finish would be more desirable.  Why?  Because the July sports calendar is much less active than October and November.  October is associated with playoff baseball, and November is peak football season, including the college football rivalry games.  In contrast, July is regularly the most boring month for sports fans.  Apart from baseball which lasts all summer, July has almost nothing.  It’s when sports programming is most scarce.

This pandemic has demonstrated the importance of scarcity to viewership and interest.  “The Last Dance,” the ESPN documentary on the Jordan-era Bulls that aired when all live sports were paused, achieved ratings that dwarfed every prior ESPN documentary.  Those ratings were comparable to the 2020 NBA Finals, World Series, and final round of The Masters, each of which aired when the market for sports content had become saturated with just about every league returning to action in the late summer and fall. 

Therefore, I propose starting the regular season the Tuesday after Thanksgiving, which is usually within a couple days of December 1.  The college football season typically wraps up the prior weekend, pending bowl games that don’t generate much excitement until New Year’s Day.  That also gives the league a few weeks to ramp up the level of play and enthusiasm before the slate of Christmas games.

(b) Reduce the Number of Games by 10+

More precisely, reduce the number of games as much as necessary to eliminate back-to-back sets (B2Bs).  As a rule of thumb, you can take one B2B off each team’s schedule by (i) removing one game or (ii) adding two calendar days.  The league has managed to significantly reduce B2Bs prior to this season (from around 20 to 12 annually per team) by shortening preseason to start the regular season a week earlier and by prioritizing B2B reduction in the scheduling algorithm.  However, as teams have similarly become more cognizant of the downsides of B2Bs, fostering more “load management” days and lesser-quality games, I think the time has come to get rid of them altogether.

I don’t see much more room to gain in terms of perfecting the algorithm or further shortening training camp or preseason, and I also don’t expect players to agree to a shorter offseason.  That leaves one option to eliminate B2Bs: reducing the number of games.

With 32 teams, here are a couple options I like:

1. 68-game schedule comprised of 4 games against divisional opponents (12) and 2 games against everyone else (56)
2. 64-game schedule comprised of 4 games against divisional opponents (12), 3 games against conference opponents (36), and 1 game against non-conference opponents (16)

More than other leagues, the NBA values fairness in scheduling such that every team in the conference plays a very similar set of opponents.  Either of the above options retains that sense of fairness, with only 5-10% of opponents determined by your division (6/68 or 3/64) as opposed to heavily skewing schedules like the NFL and MLB.  Option #1 also retains that scheduling similarity across conferences, with every team hosting every other team each year, whereas Option #2 would ease the travel burden to a greater extent, particularly for coastal teams.

By cutting 14-18 games from the schedule, the league should be able to eliminate B2Bs entirely, or if an odd B2B must be scheduled, it can be accomplished without travel in between.  That should significantly limit the need for stars to take games off and improve the consistency and overall quality of play.

Add Meaningful Games to the National TV Schedule

To counteract the loss of regular season games, the league can enhance its postseason offering.  By my calculations above, the league needed to cut approximately 12 games from the schedule to eliminate B2Bs, and my proposals cut 14-18.  That should give the league a week of wiggle room.  I therefore suggest that the NBA adopt one or both of the following:

• A single-elimination postseason tournament [“lottery tournament”] for teams that miss the playoffs.  Players on the winning team get a winner-take-all bonus similar to a playoff share, and the winning franchise gets a substantial draft benefit. 

To add the most intrigue, the winner could be awarded the #1 pick.  Many years this would result in a mediocre team (one that came reasonably close to making the playoffs), as opposed to a truly awful team, having the first pick in the draft. I consider that a positive rather than a negative, as evidenced by my other lottery reform proposals to discourage tanking.

However, there is likely a point at which the benefits of winning the tournament become too great, such that a fringe playoff team may prefer to miss the playoffs in favor of seeking to become the lottery tournament champ. Such perverse incentives should be avoided, so alternatively, the league could award the winning franchise a guarantee of no worse than the #3 pick in the draft, along with perhaps slightly improved odds of winning the lottery.  In either event, this tournament would keep fans of non-playoff teams more engaged rather than checking out by the end of the regular season. 

The entire tournament can be conducted in the span of a week or so following the regular season, while all or some subset of playoff teams get a week off to rest and prepare. 

• A play-in round somewhat beyond what’s being done this year.  Most likely, the top 6 teams in each conference are safe, and then #7/#10 and #8/#9 each play a best-of-3 series with the higher seed exclusively having home court.

The schedule could go like this:

The regular season ends on a Wednesday in mid- to late May.  The 12 teams that don’t make the playoffs/play-in meet at some predetermined location. 

Teams with the 4 worst records get a first-round bye, and teams 5-12 all play that Saturday.  You can have #5 v. #12 etc. or #5 v. #6 and #7 v. #8 etc. in the first round depending on your preference.  I prefer the latter arrangement in order to equalize the tournament odds a bit.

All the play-in teams face off that Sunday.  The lottery tournament and play-in tournament alternate days until the play-in games end on Thursday.  Then there’s a day off before the lottery tournament final on Saturday. 

Conventional playoffs start the following Sunday, the day after the lottery tournament ends.  By that point there’s been 10 days of build-up to the most compelling playoff matchups and analysis of each team’s title chances, with some meaningful games to watch in the interim.

I think that setup would generate more excitement and enthusiasm from a wider audience than the current postseason schedule, and with the playoffs then continuing through July, the NBA could dominate the summer sports calendar.

Compared to this incremental shift, there’s a much more rapid trend taking place that’s getting very little attention.  Let’s call it “Deep Space” – the exponential rise in shots several feet BEYOND the 3-point line.  Whereas overall 3-point attempts have merely doubled in the past fifteen years, the deep 3s that are becoming routine were essentially non-existent less than a decade ago.  Deep 3s have quadrupled since 2016 and increased ten-fold since 2012.

I’ll define deep 3s as jumpers taken 4+ feet beyond the 3-point line.  Excluding the corners, where a deep 3 is impossible, the NBA 3-point line is 23 feet, 9 inches from the hoop.  That places a deep 3 at 28+ feet.  To exclude heaves outside the context of conventional offense, I’ll limit deep 3s to shots in the range of 28-40 feet.

As noted above, until recently such shots effectively were not part of the game.  In the 2011-12 season, no one made more than 6 deep 3s, and Kobe led the league in attempts with just 21.  The previous season was no different: the league leader (Kyle Lowry) made 6 deep 3s, and Kobe was the only player to attempt more than 20. 

Within the next few years, two outliers emerged: Steph Curry and Damian Lillard.  Curry is of course unsurprising, as he is by most accounts the greatest long-distance shooter ever.  In 2014-15, Curry shot 27/64 (42.2%) on deep 3s.  In 2015-16, he made 47 of 91 (51.6%).  Lillard ranked second each year in both makes and attempts, shooting 13/46 and then 16/52.  No one else made more than 10 deep 3s or attempted as many as 30 in either year.

Skip ahead to this season, in which Devonte’ Graham and Davis Bertans are emblematic of a broader change in the game.  Each player is on pace to make 40-50 deep 3s on 100+ attempts.  And unlike Curry and Lillard, these are not established All-Stars or top draft picks who you might expect to have free reign over an NBA offense.  Graham is a second-year pro who struggled as a rookie after being selected 34^th in the draft, while Bertans is a spot-up shooter who comes off the bench. 

It is significant that each player has a green light to shoot from 28+ feet . . . and perhaps even more significant that their teams are substantially benefiting from it.  The Hornets offense is 12 points better per 100 possessions with Graham on the floor – the difference between the league’s 10^th best offense and far and away its worst.  Similarly, the Wizards score 10 more points per 100 possessions with Bertans on the court than without him, the difference between the league’s best offense and a below average one.

This raises two questions in my mind, which I’ll attempt to answer: (1) how does extreme long-distance shooting help an offense beyond what a typical 3-point shooter provides, and (2) why is this massive surge in deep 3s happening now?  The league as a whole made 149 deep 3s in the 2011-12 season.  Eight years later, it’s on pace for 1500+.  I expect that number to continue to climb over the next several years, which ultimately may be recognized as the Deep Space era.

The Benefits of Deep Threes

Devonte’ Graham is an undersized guard who hasn’t shown much ability to finish in the lane or around the rim.  In fact, he ranks dead last (160^th out of 160) in 2-point fg% among players with 5+ attempts per game.  So how can Graham possibly have such a positive effect on Charlotte’s offense?  I think it mostly boils down to the tremendous spacing he provides by being a threat from 30 feet out, which affords Graham and his teammates better passing, cutting, and driving lanes and more uncontested shots all over the floor.  The Hornets as a team have a 52% effective field goal percentage with Graham on the court, compared to just 47% without him.

Against ordinary shooters, defenses tend to follow established protocols that work reasonably well in denying open 3s.  For example, the game plan may dictate that a defender customarily stays close to a shooter in the near corner, helps off of a shooter above the break on the strong side, and rotates off of a shooter on the weak side.  When executing such a scheme, defenders will usually be able to rotate or recover well enough to contest a 3, provided that the shooter is positioned just outside the arc.

But defenders are not conditioned to close out on shooters a step or two farther back.  Just look at the closeouts on Graham in the video below.  D’Angelo Russell, Ky Bowman, and Marquese Chriss are primarily defending the arc, not the shooter.  Their standard closeouts don’t bother Graham’s shot, which he’s able to step into and take in rhythm from well behind the line.  Thus, Graham’s defender is forced to choose between helping off of him while likely conceding an open look if the ball swings back around to him, or staying close and disrupting the team’s usual help defense.

When Graham’s defender resolves to guard him out there, it opens up opportunities for everyone.  Somewhat paradoxically, adding an outside shooting specialist like Graham can have a greater positive effect on a team’s 2-point shooting efficiency than its 3-point efficiency.  That’s because, even off the ball, the shooter’s extreme gravity limits help in the paint.  When defenders respect a deep shooter’s ability and stay close to him, there’s typically one less defender capable of containing dribble penetration, picking up cutters, denying an entry pass, or protecting the rim.  Here, for example, the Hornets execute an easy entry pass to PJ Washington for an uncontested dunk, largely because Graham’s defender is so preoccupied with him 30 feet from the hoop that there’s no help.

The threat of the deep 3 also makes Graham a more effective creator with the ball in his hands.  As a pick-and-roll ball-handler, Graham can take advantage of defenders overplaying him 30 feet from the hoop, placing the team defense in a precarious spot.  A defender who goes over the screen that far from the hoop is effectively out of the play, at least temporarily, as long as Graham keeps his dribble.  The roll man defender is likewise in an uncomfortable position, defending more space and standing farther from the rim than usual, limiting his ability to wall off the paint.  That has a cascade effect on the defense, as it often causes another defender to collapse on Graham, leaving someone wide open.  In the clips below, watch how PJ Washington gets an uncontested 3 and then a free rim run for a dunk in the pick-and-roll because defenders respect the deep 3 threat, giving Graham a driving lane and forcing help defenders to collapse.

Big men who shoot deep 3s present a slightly different set of problems for the defense and amplify the benefits described above, as shown in the Davis Bertans clips below.  Such shooters are especially difficult to cover, as big defenders habitually sink toward the paint and are not as adept at defending the perimeter.  Their shots are also harder to contest on closeouts, given their higher release point and plane of vision. 

For example, here Devonte’ Graham and PJ Washington get a taste of their own medicine, so to speak, as Davis Bertans pulls up from 30 feet as the trailer in transition.  His usual defender, PJ, hurries back to protect the rim, leaving the undersized Graham in a mismatch on Bertans.  Graham recognizes the threat but can’t do anything about it.  With a 9-inch height advantage, Bertans drains a clean look. 

Big defenders are also more prone to shading their bodies toward the paint as an extra line of defense against dribble penetration, but when they do, they’re out of position to recover on a shooter a few feet beyond the arc.  Here, Al Horford gets caught focusing his gaze and directing his body toward Ish Smith, and as a result he can’t get back to effectively contest Bertans.

The same principles apply when the big man is used as a screener in a pick-and-pop scenario.  If his defender hedges or stunts toward the ball-handler, a big man like Bertans can take an extra step back away from the screen to prevent his man or a rotating help defender from contesting his shot.

And when defenders close out aggressively to try to make up that extra space, Bertans can attack the rim with minimal resistance, generating an easy bucket for himself or a teammate. 

That last clip offers an excellent example of how a deep-3 shooting big man can improve a team’s ability to score around the rim.  His primary defender, Jaren Jackson Jr., is also one of Memphis’s best rim protectors.  With Bertans standing a few feet behind the line, JJJ is in a difficult spot.   He can’t cover Bertans AND protect the rim.  Trying to do both, he accomplishes neither.  His closeout on Bertans is out of control, and Bertans slips by him, forcing another defender to collapse and allowing Bertans to drop the ball off to Ish Smith for an open layup.

Of course, Graham and Bertans aren’t the only ones capitalizing on a green light to take deep 3s.  This past weekend D’Angelo Russell made 6 deep 3s in a single game – as many as any player made in the entire 2011 or 2012 season.  Duncan Robinson, who went undrafted and didn’t even get a Division I scholarship offer out of high school, has flourished as a starter in Miami by spacing the floor from well behind the arc and draining enough deep 3s to keep defenders’ attention.

Why Deep Threes Have Grown Exponentially (and why this trend should continue)

There are two fundamental reasons why deep 3s are suddenly much more prevalent.  The first is at the player level, and the second is at the coaching/management level. 

Over the past few years, players who were teenagers in the Steph Curry MVP years have been entering the league.  They were developing their skills and playing styles at a time when the league’s top player was taking and making deep 3s.  Many of these players were patterning their games after him, at least in some measure, whether consciously or not.  They were practicing deep 3s regularly, whereas players in prior years treated deep 3s as a novelty that might win them a bet or a game of HORSE, not an NBA game. 

Check out this year’s deep 3 leaderboard:

Half of the top 10 are rookies or second-year players.  Another two – Russell and Porzingis – were still teenagers when Curry won his first MVP.  Unlike the shooters who came before them, they don’t have an ingrained sense that a 3-pointer in game action should be taken directly behind the line.  As those who grew up watching MVP Curry become a larger share of the player pool, expect the number of players shooting deep 3s to continue rising.

At the coaching and management level, I think the deliberate strategy of shooting deep 3s can be traced back to the 2017 Rockets and last year’s Bucks, two teams whose improved spacing helped them vault from the middle of the pack toward the top of the league.   I noted earlier that in 2015 and 2016, no one other than Curry and Lillard attempted as many as 30 deep 3s.  In 2017, Curry and Lillard remained #1 and #2 in deep 3 attempts, but numbers 3, 4, and 5 on that list were all Rockets: Ryan Anderson (57 attempts), Eric Gordon (39), and James Harden (38). 

Anderson and Gordon were unique in that they were purely spot-up shooters positioned well beyond the arc, as opposed to shot creators getting deep 3s off the dribble.  Of the deep 3s they made that season, 30 out of 31 were assisted.  With the added spacing that the threat of their deep 3s provided, the Rockets offense improved by 6 points per 100 possessions, up to #2 in the league, and the Harden/Gordon/Anderson trio was +11 per 100 possessions.  Houston’s 2-point fg% increased from 51% to 55%, narrowly trailing the Warriors and a few percentage points above anyone else.

In Milwaukee, last season the Bucks had a clear objective of maximizing their spacing around Giannis.  Brook Lopez shot 38/102 on deep 3s, ranking 4^th in the league in makes and 5^th in attempts, while Pat Connaughton, Eric Bledsoe, and Khris Middleton each ranked among the top 50 in deep 3 attempts as well.  Moreover, the Bucks traded for Nikola Mirotic, who finished in the top 20 in deep 3s made and attempted despite missing nearly half the season due to injury.  Though the team’s 3-point fg% remained unchanged from the prior year, they led the league in 2-point shooting efficiency.  The Bucks offense improved by 4 points per 100 possessions compared to 2018, and the team catapulted from the 7 seed to the best record in the NBA.  At the time of the Mirotic trade, Milwaukee’s GM Jon Horst publicly divulged his team’s strategic emphasis on deep 3s:

I’m probably at risk of sharing a competitive advantage, but it’s absolutely something unique to our lingo, our analysis. We analyze four-point shooters, that’s what we call them. To be a four-point shooter, you have to shoot above the break, right? To shoot from 30-plus feet, you’re not shooting that in the corner or the sides. So, you’re shooting above the break.

In our style of play with Giannis and Eric and Khris in particular and all the work they can do in the middle of the floor in one-on-one scenarios, being able to shoot above the break is a real benefit to our team. The further away their defenders and their offensive abilities are from where Giannis and Khris and Eric are working in the interior, the more space those three guys have to do what they do.

Now that the secret’s out, more teams are running sets to either generate a deep 3 or use that threat to open up the court.  In Washington, Bertans has already shot twice as many deep 3s as last year on 100 fewer 3-point attempts.  But this season’s biggest beneficiary of the deep 3 strategy is clearly the Dallas Mavericks, the only team with 2 players among the top 10 shooters listed above.  Combining a young roster led by Doncic and Porzingis with an emphasis on spacing via deep 3s, the Mavericks boast the league’s #1 offense – after ranking 20^th a season ago.  Doncic is shooting about 50% more deep 3s than he did as a rookie, while Porzingis has already exceeded his career highs in deep 3s made and attempted. 

Over the past week, Dallas’s use of Porzingis as a deep spot-up shooter and floor spacer rather than as an interior scorer has been a major topic of conversation, with some prominent commentators arguing that the Mavericks are wasting his abilities and size advantage.  They point to Porzingis’s mediocre individual stats, mostly down from his time with the Knicks, as evidence in that regard.  Yet Rick Carlisle was ready for the criticism, and he astutely explained that Porzingis has much more value TO THE TEAM on the perimeter:

The post-up just isn’t a good play anymore. It just isn’t a good play. It’s not a good play for a 7-3 guy. It’s a low-value situation. Our numbers are very substantial that when he spaces beyond the 3-point line, you know, we’re a historically good offensive team. And when any of our guys go in there, our effectiveness is diminished exponentially. . .  We’ve got to realize that this game has changed. It’s changed. It’s just a fact. And he’s a guy when he spaces beyond the arc, above the break, is a historically great all-time 3-point shooter with unbelievable efficiency.

His perspective is certainly borne out by the numbers, as well as the film.  This set, for example, is absolutely devastating.  Porzingis establishes contact with Blake Griffin, then circles back around a Dwight Powell screen to run a pick-and-pop action with Doncic 30 feet from the hoop.  As Griffin and Andre Drummond both step out toward Porzingis, Doncic drives to the rim aided by another Powell pick, with only Luke Kennard left in his path. 

While Doncic’s stepback 3s make the highlight reels, generating easy finishes like this is the main contributor to his growth this season.  His 3-point fg% is actually down, but inside the arc he’s improved from 50% to 61%, with more of his attempts coming around the rim where he’s converting 76% of the time.  When Doncic and Porzingis share the court with the Dallas’s other most prolific 3-point shooter, Tim Hardaway, the Mavs are outscoring opponents by 14 points per 100 possessions.

Following the overwhelming success of Curry’s Warriors and the teams most enthusiastically adopting the deep 3 strategy, I expect that more and more teams will pursue it going forward. 

The Brooklyn Nets grabbed all the headlines at the start of free agency, securing commitments from both Kyrie Irving and Kevin Durant when the negotiation period began this past Sunday afternoon. But the terms of their agreements didn’t start trickling out until late Sunday night, and while those contract details have garnered much less attention than the commitments themselves, they’re far more interesting from a CBA / cap management perspective.

Neither Kyrie Irving nor Kevin Durant negotiated a straight maximum-salary contract. Rather, each player’s new deal guarantees only 85%-90% of his annual max salary, with the remainder of his max salary payable as a performance bonus based on team success. Reportedly those performance benchmarks are (a) 45 regular season wins and (b) reaching the second round of the playoffs.

Since the Nets failed to reach those benchmarks this past season—they won 42 games and then lost in Round 1—the bonuses are initially classified as “unlikely” and don’t count against the salary cap. And by structuring the contracts this way, the Nets freed up cap space that they then used to negotiate a 4-year, $40M deal with DeAndre Jordan.

That’s the simple explanation. The reality is a bit more complicated, as it should be. After all, if a team could reduce its cap hit on all new contracts by tanking the previous season and then offering “unlikely” bonuses for any team improvement, then tanking would become an especially attractive option. Couldn’t the Knicks—the team with the league’s worst record and most cap space—have signed THREE max-salary free agents by offering each one a substantial bonus if the team wins just 20 games? To answer this question and see whether the Nets’ moves will hold up, let’s turn to the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

CBA Provisions

The bonuses at issue are governed by Article VII, Section 3(d) (“Incentive Compensation”) in conjunction with Article VII, Section 5(d) (“Performance Bonuses”).

Section 3(d)(1) states as follows:

For purposes of determining a player’s Salary each Salary Cap Year, except as provided in Sections 3(d)(2)-(4) below, any Performance Bonus (provided such Performance Bonus may be included in a Player Contract in accordance with Section 5(d) below), shall be included in Salary only if such Performance Bonus would be earned if the Team’s or player’s performance were identical to the performance in the immediately preceding Salary Cap Year. [p. 173]

A performance bonus that’s included in team salary is labeled a “likely” bonus, whereas an “unlikely” bonus is one that’s excluded for cap purposes.

Section 5(d) sets a limit on any unlikely bonuses, stating that “no Player Contract may provide for Unlikely Bonuses in any Salary Cap Year that exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the player’s Regular Salary for such Salary Cap Year at the time the Contract is signed.” [Art. VII, Section 5(d)(1)] [p. 196].

Based on the above provisions, as long as the “unlikely” bonuses do not exceed 15% of a player’s salary, the Nets or even the 17-win Knicks could offer bonuses for any team improvement whatsoever, and those bonuses would not count towards the salary cap.

According to Bobby Marks in the previously-linked article, that max bonus figure is $5.7M for Durant and $4.9M for Kyrie. I’ve seen these same figures reported elsewhere, but they’re a bit off. These numbers are simply 15% of Durant and Kyrie’s max salaries. The actual max bonuses are somewhat lower, because the 15% figure in Section 5(d) is a percentage of the player’s guaranteed compensation, not a percentage of his max compensation. “Regular Salary” is defined to exclude incentive compensation and other bonuses under CBA Article I, Section 1(zz). [p. 8].

Given that Durant’s individual max salary as a 10+ year veteran is $38.2M, his max bonus is $5.0M (solving for X in 1.15X = $38.2M yields a guaranteed base salary of $33.2M). By the same calculation, Kyrie’s max bonus is $4.3M based on the $32.7M max salary for players with 7-9 years of experience. Creating $9.3M in cap space (sum of those 2 bonus amounts) would precisely enable Brooklyn to sign DeAndre Jordan to a 4-year, $40M deal—starting at that $9.3M level, with maximum 5% annual raises. The Nets know what they’re doing.

The next paragraph of Section 5(d) adds another limitation on bonuses:

No Player Contract may provide for any Unlikely Bonus for the first Salary Cap Year covered by the Contract that, if included in the player’s Salary for such Salary Cap Year, would result in the Team’s Team Salary exceeding the Room under which it is signing the Contract. For the sole purpose of determining whether a Team has Room for a new Unlikely Bonus, the Team’s Room shall be deemed reduced by all Unlikely Bonuses in Contracts approved by the Commissioner that may be paid to all of the Team’s players that entered into Player Contracts (including Renegotiations) during that Salary Cap Year. [Article VII, Section 5(d)(2)] [p. 197]

This provision is intended to prevent cap circumvention, and the Nets are acutely aware of its effect as well. The rule stipulates that, whenever signing a contract with an unlikely bonus, the team must have sufficient cap room to cover all unlikely bonuses offered to that point in the salary cap year.

The Nets created enough cap space to sign both Kyrie and KD to full max contracts, so they are in compliance as long as they sign DeAndre Jordan last. Whereas both Kyrie and KD’s contracts contain unlikely bonuses triggering the requirement to count all unlikely bonuses for cap purposes, DeAndre’s contract does not. His contract adds no “new Unlikely Bonus,” rendering Section 5(d)(2) inapplicable. Thus, any existing unlikely bonuses are excluded when calculating the cap room remaining to sign him. Again, the Nets know what they’re doing.

However, there is still one potential roadblock in the way of the Nets’ plan. Section 3(d)(1) merely states the default rule for classifying bonuses as “likely” or “unlikely,” which is subject to challenge as set forth in the following paragraph, Section 3(d)(2):

Notwithstanding Section 3(d)(1) above, in the event that, at the time of the signing of a Contract, Renegotiation or Extension, the NBA or the Players Association believes that the performance of a player and/or his Team during the immediately preceding Salary Cap Year does not fairly predict the likelihood of the player earning a Performance Bonus during any Salary Cap Year covered by the Contract, Renegotiation or extended term of the Extension (as the case may be), the NBA or the Players Association may request that a jointly selected basketball expert (“Expert”) determine whether (i) in the case of an NBA challenge, it is very likely that the bonus will be earned, or (ii) in the case of a Players Association challenge, it is very likely that the bonus will not be earned. The party initiating a proceeding before the Expert shall carry the burden of proof. . . . If, following an NBA challenge, the Expert determines that a Performance Bonus is very likely to be earned, the bonus shall be included in the player’s Salary. . . . [pp. 173-74]

The challenge system described above provides another mechanism to prevent cap circumvention, particularly in the event that a team seeks to exclude as “unlikely” a bonus that will almost certainly convey. For example, if the Knicks were to cut enough salary to (a) sign Kyrie and Jimmy Butler to contracts with maximum “unlikely” bonuses for the Knicks winning 20 games and then (b) sign Kawhi as well, I strongly believe that the NBA League Office would intervene with a successful challenge on the basis that those “unlikely” bonuses are very likely to be earned.

The Nets’ bonuses present a closer question. Will the NBA League Office mount a challenge on the basis that Kyrie and KD’s bonuses should be deemed likely rather than unlikely? I believe the answer is no, for 4 principal reasons.

Why the League Office Won’t Challenge Kyrie and KD’s “Unlikely” Bonuses

(1) Kevin Durant’s Injury

In this one very specific context, Durant’s injury works in Brooklyn’s favor. If he were healthy, the Nets would be a title contender projected to finish with one of the NBA’s best records. The League would be in a strong position to argue that the team performance benchmarks will be achieved and thus the bonuses should be reclassified as “likely.” With KD potentially out all year though, it’s hard to say how much the Nets have improved on last year’s 42-win roster.

There’s a curious phrase in Section 3(d)(2) that complicates the analysis. Rather than restricting the inquiry to whether a bonus is likely in the first year of the contract, the CBA states that a challenge may be requested where a party believes that performance “during the immediately preceding Salary Cap Year does not fairly predict the likelihood of the player earning a Performance Bonus during any Salary Cap Year covered by the Contract.”

Frankly, I find this aspect of the provision confusing and ambiguous. If the League believes that the bonus is likely in Years Two and Three but not necessarily in Year One, what’s the remedy? Should the initial classification for cap purposes be based on the bonus’s likelihood of being earned in the majority of the contract years rather than in Year One? Would the deciding expert be asked to deem the bonus “likely” for Year Two irrespective of whether it’s earned in Year One, overriding the standard whereby each subsequent year’s bonus is classified as “likely” or “unlikely” based on whether it was earned in the immediately preceding contract year? I don’t see anything in the CBA that’s instructive here.

The upcoming season is more straightforwardly relevant than future seasons, and I’d expect it to be the focus of any review. The early lines set Brooklyn’s 2019-20 over/under at 47.5 wins. Is that a large enough deviation from the 45-win benchmark to warrant reclassification?

Such questions lead to reason #2 why the League is unlikely to mount a challenge.

(2) The League Office’s Burden of Proof

The CBA explicitly states that the party initiating a review, i.e. the League in this instance, “shall carry the burden of proof.” [Article VII, Section 3(d)(2)]. For non-lawyers, burden of proof is a legal concept concerning the allocation of evidentiary responsibility. More simply, the party with the burden of proof must present evidence demonstrating that its position should prevail. Where evidence is lacking or unpersuasive, the party with the burden of proof loses.

There are various levels of proof required depending on the situation. In business disputes and other civil matters, a “preponderance of the evidence” standard is most common. This means that a party need only show that its position is more likely than not. Section 3(d)(3) offers an example of this standard, stating that where a free agent was inactive the previous season, any dispute shall be determined based on “whether the bonus is likely to be earned or not likely to be earned.” [pp. 174-75].

Fortunately for Brooklyn, this relaxed standard of proof would not apply to any challenge of the Kyrie and KD bonuses. Rather, the League must demonstrate that “it is very likely that the bonus will be earned” in order to prevail. [Article VII, Section 3(d)(2)].

The term “very likely” connotes more than a mere preponderance of the evidence, though it probably falls short of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard employed in most criminal trials. I’d liken it to the intermediate “clear and convincing evidence” standard, which would require the league to show that a 45-win season is substantially more likely than not.

Although there’s no fixed probability associated with such a standard, I expect that the retained expert—the decision-maker in any challenge—would want to see wide agreement among statistical models and oddsmakers that the Nets should reach 45 wins this year with room to spare.

If that’s the standard, I doubt that the NBA League Office would prevail. As noted earlier, the consensus Vegas line has the Nets at 47.5 wins, just 2.5 over the 45-win benchmark. Further, I’ve seen statistical models that are less sanguine about Brooklyn this year. For example, even after all the reported deals, Jacob Goldstein’s model projects the Nets as just a 37-win team:

Updated 2019-20 win projection for the Nets after agreeing to deal with Wilson Chandler: pic.twitter.com/WdycT1y4Sx

— Jacob Goldstein (@JacobEGoldstein) July 3, 2019

Considering Kyrie’s injury history, Durant’s unavailability, and the losses of D’Angelo Russell and several other rotation players, it wouldn’t be particularly surprising if the Nets failed to improve on last year’s win total. And making the 2^nd round of the playoffs is no easy feat either. Those aforementioned betting lines show 5 other teams in the East projected to win at least as many games as the Nets: Milwaukee, Philly, Toronto, Indy, and Boston.

Looking beyond this upcoming season, I think it’s too speculative to say with a high degree of confidence that the Nets should reach those benchmarks. Durant’s ruptured Achilles isn’t like most injuries; you can’t assume it’ll fully heal and he’ll be the same player he was. Plus, the confusion and ambiguity identified earlier weighs against the party with the burden of proof. I’m skeptical that seasons in the more distant future should even be taken into account when determining whether a bonus is likely or unlikely.

In all, the NBA League Office would have a difficult time proving that it’s “very likely” the performance bonuses will be achieved.

(3) Minimal Competitive Balance Concerns

This is a very different situation from one where a team manipulates the cap in order to sign a third superstar. DeAndre Jordan is a solid role player; he’s not Kawhi Leonard.

The balance of power in the East doesn’t hinge on whether or not the Nets are able to sign DeAndre Jordan, and no team’s offseason planning was built around signing him. The NBA is a collection of teams, and it’s hard to imagine any other team making a huge fuss about this. Lacking pressure from other teams, the League probably doesn’t have much of an appetite to bring a challenge.

(4) Maintaining a Positive Relationship with the Players Association

In free agency, the Players Association (NBPA) has two main objectives: promoting player autonomy and maximizing player salaries. The Kyrie, KD, and DeAndre Jordan deals serve both objectives.

The essential purpose of Kyrie and KD’s bonuses is to enable their preferred teammate DeAndre to sign for more money than he would otherwise make, either in Brooklyn or elsewhere. I sincerely doubt that any other team would offer DeAndre Jordan a contract as big as his 4-year, $40M deal with the Nets. Looking around the league, center is the deepest position with the highest replacement level. Veteran centers who don’t spread the floor, i.e. non-shooters like DeAndre, are taking pay cuts this summer and typically signing for substantially less than $40M. Robin Lopez, Enes Kanter, and Ed Davis each agreed to a deal for the 2-year, $9.8M room exception.

If the League challenged the Kyrie and KD bonuses, it effectively would be seeking to reduce DeAndre Jordan’s salary. Practically speaking, that’s all a successful challenge would accomplish.

Given this reality, I think that the NBPA would be especially annoyed by such a challenge and would fight it vigorously. And that’s one more reason why the League won’t employ the challenge system here. I expect that maintaining goodwill with the NBPA is more important to the League than securing a relatively inconsequential bonus reclassification.

Carson Edwards (Purdue) – 6’0.25” 199 pounds, 6’6” wingspan

Optimistic Comp: Lou Williams in Mo Williams’s body, with shades of Damian Lillard

Role: Hibachi Scorer & Extreme Floor Spacer

ESPN Mock #34 (updated #35)

I have to admit that I’m concerned by Edwards’s similarities to Jawun Evans—probably my biggest scouting miss in recent years. Both Edwards and Evans are undersized, high-usage point guards who led hyper-efficient offenses against a top-5 NCAA schedule. In 2017 I named Evans one of the most underrated players in the draft, along with Donovan Mitchell, Derrick White, and Jordan Bell. Evans’s game hasn’t translated to the NBA, mostly due to his inability to get good shots against bigger and more athletic defenders. Unfortunately for Carsen Edwards, he and Jawun Evans are almost exactly the same size in terms of height, wingspan, and standing reach. Evans also showed better vision, creativity, and pick and roll proficiency as a distributor in college.

So why am I so high on Edwards? Really it comes down to 3 advantages he has over Evans: separation, range, and strength. Whereas Evans was a very crafty scorer in college, using screens and a tight handle to generate just enough space for his jumpers, floaters, scoops, and circus shots, Edwards is a truly dynamic shooter who routinely gets wide open despite being the focus of the defense. His jumper has a suddenness about it that catches defenders flat-footed, as he’s able to go from a full sprint to rising up for a shot in a blink, either off the dribble or running around a screen. Check out the slideshow above and see just how far the nearest defender is from Edwards when he releases his shot.

Combined with this ability to shoot off of movement and create separation, Edwards’s range is what really sets him apart from other prospects. Any decent 3-point shooter helps a team’s spacing; only a few players bend the court toward them. Steph Curry, Damian Lillard, and Trae Young stand out in a league full of outstanding shooters due to their shot volume and efficiency 30+ feet from the hoop. They demand attention from the defense as soon as they cross the half court line. Carsen Edwards may be another such player.

Edwards led the Big Ten with 380 3-point field goal attempts—116 more than anyone else—and many of those attempts were well beyond the arc. In addition, the majority of his made 3s were unassisted. His range off the dribble was on full display in Purdue’s Elite Eight loss to future national champion and perennial defensive juggernaut UVA. En route to scoring 42 points on 14-25 shooting with 10 threes, Edwards knocked down at least a few shots from 30+ feet out:

CARSEN EDWARDS FROM THE PARKING LOT! ?#MarchMadness | #Elite8 pic.twitter.com/kZrMvfpM9P

— NCAA March Madness (@marchmadness) March 31, 2019

MAKE THAT 7 ?'s for CARSEN EDWARDS! ??#MarchMadness | @BoilerBall pic.twitter.com/vUgfNYkyxR

— NCAA March Madness (@marchmadness) March 31, 2019

CARSEN EDWARDS FROM THE LOGO! ?#MarchMadness | #Elite8 pic.twitter.com/K6iSWsvPWm

— NCAA March Madness (@marchmadness) March 31, 2019

Finally, though Edwards is undersized by most measures, he’s significantly stronger than the average point guard. He completed 14 reps of the max bench press at the combine—tied for 6^th best among all prospects and 13 more than Evans a couple years prior. At 199 pounds, he’s heavier and more muscular than each of the aforementioned shooting savants (Curry, Lillard, and Trae). Since he’s built like a tank, Edwards isn’t bothered by contact, brushing it off or using it to his advantage as a ballhandler. His strength and bulk should also come in handy setting screens, particularly considering how effective great shooters can be as screeners in today’s NBA. He’s actually very similar in build to Kyle Lowry and Fred VanVleet, the short but sturdy guard tandem that played most crunch-time minutes together for the Raptors during their run to the title. Since their size wasn’t an impediment to Toronto, I’m thinking that Edwards’s size limitations are overblown. If he were 3 inches taller with the same wingspan, he’d be a lottery pick.

Matisse Thybulle (Washington) – 6’5” 195 pounds, 7’0” wingspan (unofficial)

Optimistic Comp: era-adjusted Michael Cooper, or Andre Roberson with a credible jumper

Role: Tenacious Perimeter Defender & Spot-Up Shooter

ESPN Mock #24 (updated #33)

Simply put, with respect to perimeter defense, Thybulle is arguably the most exciting prospect in recent memory. In the above photo, you can see him licking his lips as a ballhawk salivating in anticipation of jumping the passing lane and possibly nabbing a steal against USC. He wound up with 7 steals and 2 blocks in that game. Then he had another 7 steals and a block the next game against UCLA, followed by 5 steals and 5 blocks at Arizona. In all, Thybulle had at least 6 combined steals and blocks in 20 of his 36 games this past season, including both of his NCAA Tournament games.

Those steal and block totals dwarf what anyone else in college basketball has done. In the past 2 years, Thybulle has seasons of (i) 126 steals and 82 blocks and (ii) 101 steals and 49 blocks. Here’s the list of player seasons with at least 40 blocks in that span, sorted by steals. No one else has more than 85 steals, and limiting the analysis to other major-conference players, Zion’s 70 steals is the next-best total. It’s also notable that every major-conference player in the top 25 on that list is a legit NBA prospect or current NBA player. Steals and blocks are pretty good indicators of NBA-level athleticism and awareness.

There’s no question that Thybulle can be a plus defender at the NBA level, and perhaps an elite one. At Washington he’s starred as a smothering individual defender and a game-changing team defender in the Huskies’ zone, with a combination of quickness, length, effort, anticipation, and timing that made Washington a top-20 defense despite a glaring lack of size on the roster. The questions for Thybulle are on the other end of the floor.

Offensively, Thybulle’s college career has been underwhelming. His 2- and 3-point shooting percentages are essentially average, and his usage is a bit below. His assist and turnover rates are adequate for a wing though subpar for a non-scoring guard. His best statistical indicator is his strong FT%, 78% for his career and 85% in the most recent season, though he doesn’t get to the free throw line often.

Thybulle’s efficiency, usage, and ballhandling metrics align closely with Roberson’s, making him an especially attractive comp. Roberson is an exceedingly low-usage NBA player, with below-average efficiency and a wholly unreliable jumper (25.7% from 3 for his career), yet he’s still a net positive because of his defense. By Real Plus-Minus, he ranked as the league’s #7 shooting guard in each of his past two healthy seasons.

So even if Thybulle is effectively a one-way player like Roberson, shouldn’t he still be a top-20 prospect in this draft class? And then there’s the fact that Thybulle is a much better free throw shooter than Roberson, who made 58% of his free throws in college and just 47% in the pros, making it probable that unlike Roberson, Thybulle will be at least a somewhat credible threat as a spot-up shooter. Prospects with similar NCAA shooting splits like Delon Wright, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, Jae Crowder, and Will Barton have trended toward being serviceable NBA 3-point shooters, in the 33-35% range. If that’s where Thybulle ends up, he seems destined to outperform his draft position.

DaQuan Jeffries (Tulsa) – 6’5” 216 pounds, 6’11.25” wingspan

Comp: Pat Connaughton, James Ennis, Royce O’Neale

Role: Moreyball Wing

ESPN Mock #43 (updated #47)

DaQuan Jeffries knows a good scoring opportunity from a bad one, and he’s only interested in the good ones. Of his 404 points this year, Jeffries scored 372 (92.1%) from three spots: the 3-point line (135), the free throw line (83), and at the rim (154). Those also happen to be the 3 most efficient scoring locations. Thus, it’s unsurprising that Jeffries has been a remarkably efficient collegiate scorer. His True Shooting% by year has been 65%, 64%, and 62% in his 3 seasons, the last of which on above-average usage.

Jeffries should not be a high-usage scorer in the NBA. He doesn’t have the shot variation or creation ability for that. So I’ve dispensed with the optimistic comps and simply listed the most realistic ones. Like many successful overlooked prospects before him, Jeffries projects as a low-usage, reasonably high-efficiency wing with the length, strength, and athleticism to competently defend multiple positions. Most NBA teams could use another guy like that in their rotation.

And though I won’t discuss his athleticism in detail, it’s definitely a plus. He’s strong across the board in the key functional athleticism indicators (offensive rebounds, steals, blocks, free throw rate, scoring at the rim), particularly so with respect to blocks. Though Jeffries is just 6’5” he led the AAC in block rate in 2018 and finished 5^th in that category this past year. He also won the 2019 NCAA dunk contest, in fairly spectacular fashion:

We knew @CollegeSLAM was OVER when DaQuan Jeffries channeled his inner VINSANITY! @mrvincecarter15 x @daquan_jeffries#ReignCane ?? #ForOurCity pic.twitter.com/oXrJEHe5P3

— Tulsa Basketball (@TUMBasketball) April 5, 2019

For more on Jeffries, check out this great scouting report by Ben Pfeifer.

Grant Williams (Tennessee) – 6’7.5” 240 pounds, 6’9.75” wingspan

Optimistic Comp: thicker Josh Howard, or David West with shorter arms

Role: Frontcourt Jack of All Trades

ESPN Mock #32 (updated #30)

I’m not going to write a ton on Grant Williams, because it’s all already been written. He’s this year’s winner of the “biggest disparity between NBA draft twitter and front office consensus” award. He’s also the epitome of the super-productive all-around college player who doesn’t look the part of a top draft pick, and those guys tend to far exceed expectations. I’ve listed a couple such players as comps in Josh Howard and David West, and of course Draymond Green is another.

Grant Williams is the back-to-back SEC Player of the Year, and a guy who stands out in a remarkable number of areas: scoring in the paint, getting to the free throw line, shooting mid-range jumpers, passing out of the post, facilitating from the perimeter, rebounding, interior defense, perimeter defense, and probably more.

Take a look at the two photos above, which illustrate Williams’s versatility. In the first, he’s playing post defense against Simi Shittu, an NBA PF/C prospect at Vanderbilt. Though Williams is giving up a couple inches in height and more in wingspan, Williams’s strength and positioning give him the advantage. In the second, he’s defending guard Tyler Herro of Kentucky, a likely 1^st round pick, on the perimeter. Williams has no difficulty in this situation either, using his awareness and positioning to contain Herro. That ended up being Herro’s worst game in conference play, as he shot 2-11 with 5 turnovers.

Rather than going on about Williams, I’ll direct you to some more comprehensive analysis of his game, starting with Brian Schroeder’s article in Dime Magazine, which includes the following succinct explanation of why Williams is so underrated:

The scouting report on Williams is hard to contextualize, because there aren’t really many players like him. Undersized as a big man and oversized as a pure wing, he’s a post scoring, post passing, close contact player in an era that emphasizes movement on the perimeter over anything else. His raw numbers are good (18.8 points, 7.5 rebounds, 3.2 assists, 1.1 steals, 1.5 blocks per game), but don’t leap off the screen the same way that, say, Ja Morant’s do.

He can still hold up in the NBA because he possesses three rare attributes that almost every good NBA player has: he’s smart (both in the traditional sense and in the basketball sense), he’s strong, and he’s got great touch. Those three things can make even a sub-NBA athlete into a star (see: Jokić, Nikola).

For more, check out these two pieces by The Stepien’s Ben Rubin, who’s probably my single favorite draft analyst out there: The Upside Case For Grant Williams and Grant Williams Chosen Between 24 and 40 as The Draft’s Second Best Play.

Nic Claxton (Georgia) – 6’11.75” 217 pounds, 7’2.5” wingspan, 9’2” standing reach

Optimistic Comp: Pascal Siakam or Josh Smith, hopefully with the former’s self-discipline

Role: Athletic, Switchable Big / Secondary Shot Creator

ESPN Mock #31 (updated #32)

I don’t know if I truly consider Claxton the most underrated prospect in the draft, but in my view he’s the most interesting prospect. His upside is just absolutely massive. If I were ranking this draft by potential, he’d be in the top 5. By every measurable other than weight, he has NBA Center size. But he moves like an athletic Small Forward, and he flashes offensive skills that are rare for any big man, let alone a teenager.

On a team seriously lacking talent in a tough conference, Claxton led Georgia in just about every statistical category: field goals, free throws, rebounds, steals, and blocks, and he even placed a close second in assists. About half the time, Georgia played without a point guard, rendering Claxton functionally a point center.

As a result, there’s some serious context needed to evaluate Claxton’s subpar shooting efficiency (53.3% True Shooting, including 50.9% from 2). Whereas many draft-eligible bigs take around 2/3 of their shots at the rim and the majority of those shots are assisted, Claxton barely got 1/3 of his shots at the rim, the majority of which were unassisted. He made over 70% of those attempts. Given how often Claxton was tasked with creating offense from the perimeter, it’s impressive that he shot as well as he did.

When Claxton created his own offense on dribble drives, the results were sometimes jaw-dropping. Watch the 7 or 8 drives starting at the 3:25 mark and see for yourself:

And that doesn’t even include my favorite clip, which I’ve only found embedded in this TJ Oxley scouting report. There, Claxton uses a hesitation dribble to get by his primary defender before eluding the rim protector with an acrobatic reverse layup.

Watching Claxton, it’s easy to get visions of Giannis or Kevin Durant. Claxton has his share of clumsy dribbling and bad decision-making as well, but again, keep in mind that he’s a 19-year-old, 7-foot tall, #1 scoring option in the SEC.

I can’t think of any other 7-footers in the NCAA who regularly score on dribble drives or run pick & roll as the ballhandler rather than the roll man. Claxton also spots up beyond the arc with some regularity, and while the results have been mediocre (30% on 86 3PA in his career), his combination of decent shooting form and reasonably high volume is promising.

In evaluating Claxton, it’s important to keep in mind that offense is by far Claxton’s lesser side of the ball. Even if he settles into the NBA as a low-usage dive man offensively, he still has a high ceiling based on his defensive potential. He has a 9’2” standing reach and 36.5” vertical, which allowed him to lead the SEC in blocks this year. But more than that, he moves his feet so well that he stands to be one of the most switchable defenders in the league. Here he is defending Texas’s star senior guard and pro prospect Kerwin Roach, staying with him throughout the possession before ultimately forcing a turnover:

Here it is. THE Claxton clip pic.twitter.com/UNX6pl30Uu

— Max Carlin (@maxacarlin) May 16, 2019

Claxton certainly isn’t the safest pick in this draft, and it’s possible that he’ll never settle into a role in the NBA. He’s so thin that he’ll get bullied around in certain matchups, and his ballhandling may be more tantalizing than it is useful at the NBA level. But drafting late in the first round, I’d want to place a bet on Claxton’s potential over anyone else on the board.

The 2018 draft was very strong, particularly at the top. Each of the top 5 picks made the All-Rookie First Team. Though voting on All-Rookie teams tends to be biased somewhat by draft position, this result was largely justified. Each of these players was among the 8 rookies with 3+ Win Shares this season. Further, eight of the top 10 and ten of the top 13 rookies by Win Shares were lottery picks. Other advanced stats paint a similar picture. Using VORP (Value Over Replacement Player, based on Box Plus-Minus), lottery picks account for 7 of the top 8, 9 of the top 12, and 10 of the top 14.

But every draft is different. While it may be tempting to view the 2018 draft as evidence that lottery picks are especially valuable or that teams are getting better at prospect evaluation, you don’t have to go back far to see that talent is often much more evenly distributed.

Looking instead at the previous 5 drafts, you might be tempted to conclude that there’s barely any relationship at all between draft position and NBA success. In that time, we’ve seen a few #1 overall picks struggle mightily (Anthony Bennett, Andrew Wiggins, Markelle Fultz), while non-lottery, second round, and even undrafted players have become stars or key contributors on contending teams. The top 2 players to date from those drafts went #15 (Giannis) and #41 (Jokic).

Meanwhile, the Toronto Raptors just won the NBA title without a single lottery pick on the entire roster. Their 8-man rotation consisted of the following players (sorted by Finals playing time, with draft position in parentheses): Kawhi Leonard (2011 #15), Pascal Siakam (2016 #27), Kyle Lowry (2006 #24), Fred VanVleet (2016 undrafted), Marc Gasol (2007 #48), Serge Ibaka (2008 #24), Danny Green (2009 #46), and Norman Powell (2015 #46).

Turning to the 2019 draft, nearly everyone agrees that Zion Williamson is the clear top pick, and after that there’s a small group of players considered to be part of tier 2—usually including Ja Morant and RJ Barrett. There’s less of a consensus after that, though from the mock drafts I’ve seen, the rest of the lottery should include several freshmen lacking standout college production, as well as a few older NCAA players with physical limitations and one prospect from a lower-level foreign league.

This differs substantially from last year, when the freshmen outside the top few picks were legitimately elite college players (e.g., Trae Young, Jaren Jackson Jr., Wendell Carter Jr., and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander).

Rather, this draft is much more analogous to 2015 and 2016. Each of those drafts featured a consensus #1 (KAT and Ben Simmons), followed by a 1-2 player second tier and a lot of uncertainty thereafter, resulting in a lottery featuring unproductive freshmen, upperclassmen with major limitations, and prospects from lower-level foreign leagues. A substantial majority of those players have not panned out as pros thus far.

Apart from the success of the #1 overall pick, those two drafts look very flat in retrospect. Josh Richardson, arguably the 2015 draft’s best wing, was selected with pick #40. Also in that part of the draft, #41 Pat Connaughton and #46 Norman Powell have fared better in the NBA than the first two wings off the board, Mario Hezonja (#5) and Stanley Johnson (#8). In both drafts the late-first to early-second round range appears to have had comparable talent to the early- to mid-first round, minus #1 overall. Players selected between #20 and #36 include Caris Levert, Delon Wright, Pascal Siakam, Larry Nance Jr., Kevon Looney, Montrezl Harrell, Ivica Zubac, and Malcolm Brogdon.

A couple undrafted players from 2015, Quinn Cook and Alfonzo McKinnie, cracked the Warriors’ recent Finals rotation, and the 2016 undrafted pool is even stronger: Fred VanVleet, Yogi Ferrell, Bryn Forbes, David Nwaba, Dorian Finney-Smith, and Ryan Arcidiacono.

These guys aren’t stars (with the possible exception of Siakam), but the same can be said of just about everyone outside the #1 pick in those drafts. The point is that a weak lottery generally is not indicative of a lack of useful players later in the draft. More likely, it suggests that there is value in trading down.

Since the caliber of prospect available in the mid- to late lottery is not substantially different from what you’ll find in the late first or early second round, if not later, dealing that lottery pick for a later selection and another asset is a smart move. Trading down makes even more sense when you take financial considerations into account, as mid-lottery picks make a lot more money than late first rounders. The 2019-20 NBA rookie salary scale dictates that, for example, picks 4-7 will make $5M this season on average, 3x as much as picks 24-27.

If you extend the analysis 4 years down the road to restricted free agency, the financial component weighs even more heavily in favor of trading down. The recent CBA increased cap holds across the board for free agents coming off of their rookie contracts, though in absolute terms the increases are much higher toward the top of the draft. For instance, the 2015 #4 pick, Kristaps Porzingis, takes up $17.1M of Dallas’s cap space this summer until his next contract is finalized, which can be done after the Mavericks sign other free agents. In contrast, the 2018 #4 pick, Jaren Jackson Jr., would cost $27.5M against the cap if he reaches restricted free agency in 2022. At the #24 pick, 2015 draftee Tyus Jones currently has a $7.3M cap hold, compared to an $11.8M future cap hold for 2018 draftee Anfernee Simons.

In sum, moving down in the draft can vastly improve a team’s future cap position, much more than under the previous CBA. As shown above, whereas the difference in cap holds between the #4 and #24 picks previously had been under $10M (Porzingis (17.1) minus Tyus (7.3)), that difference now exceeds $15M (JJJ (27.5) minus Simons (11.8)). In that sense, along with the direct benefits of the deal, by trading down a team can in effect gain a future first round pick as a hidden benefit, considering that the going rate to buy a mid- first rounder is approximately $15M in free agent spending power. Where the prospects are comparable, the one drafted late is substantially more valuable from a team-building perspective than the one drafted early.

Presuming that the 2019 draft is among the flatter drafts based on its likeness to 2015 and 2016, and that trading down is therefore the optimal strategy, we are left with this basic question: which prospects available later in the draft are most likely to succeed in the NBA?

Based on my review of recent drafts, I find that most of the particularly overlooked players fall into one or more of the following three categories:

1. Broadly Productive Veteran Guards/Wings
2. Unconventional/Unheralded Bigs
3. Foreigners from Lesser Leagues

Broadly Productive Veteran Guards/Wings (e.g., Fred VanVleet, Monte Morris, Malcolm Brogdon, Caris LeVert, Josh Hart, Jimmy Butler, Jae Crowder, Draymond Green)

Reading the floor and quickly making good decisions with the ball is extremely difficult. Very rarely will a prospect have this ability coming out of high school, and getting repetitions at a higher level goes a long way towards preparing a perimeter player for the NBA. When a player demonstrates proficiency as a distributor, scorer, and defender at the college level, there’s a pretty strong chance he’ll succeed in the NBA. Here’s what I wrote about VanVleet a few years ago when he wasn’t selected in the draft:

Fred VanVleet was one of the most productive point guards in college basketball in each of the past 3 years. He finished his college career with 2 Missouri Valley Conference Player of the Year Awards, the 3rd most assists and 7th most steals in conference history, a 3:1 assist-to-turnover ratio, and 9 NCAA Tournament victories. Despite all those achievements, VanVleet was not selected in last month’s draft.

Why wasn’t he drafted? For the most part, it’s due to his physical limitations. Standing 6 feet tall with a 6’2” wingspan, VanVleet is small even for a point guard. He also doesn’t have particularly quick feet, either in a straight line or laterally, and he’s not much of a leaper either. He didn’t finish well around the rim in college, so it’s basically a foregone conclusion that he won’t be able to do so in the NBA.

Even granting that all of these criticisms are valid, I think he could have a solid NBA career as a backup point guard. I’d say that “pesky” is the best word to describe VanVleet as a defender, and I mean that entirely as a compliment. He crowds ball handlers and tests the boundaries of what refs will let him get away with in terms of physical contact. He doesn’t get phased by screens, as even though he’s small he’s sturdy and tough-minded, and he’s hyper-aware of what’s going on around him. If you get the chance to see him in the Summer League, watch how he communicates with his teammates and intermittently diverts his attention from his man for a split-second to keep track of where everyone is on the floor.

That awareness translates equally well to the offensive end, where VanVleet established himself as arguably the most polished and unflappable pick-and-roll ball handler in the college game. . . . Since VanVleet won’t be much of a threat to drive to the rim and score in the NBA, he’ll need to shoot well from the outside. VanVleet converted 38.6% of his 3s in college, and from what I’ve seen he’s comfortable adjusting to the NBA line.

VanVleet has certainly proven that he belongs in the NBA, as players of this type often do.

Unconventional/Unheralded Bigs (e.g., Draymond Green, Pascal Siakam, Larry Nance Jr., Kyle Kuzma, Dwight Powell, Nikola Jokic)

Notice that Draymond would qualify in each of the first two categories, and this is the more obvious one for him as the prototype small-ball center. In the NBA draft, teams still gravitate toward big men who are at least 7’ tall, score in the post, protect the rim, and come from a marquee NCAA program. Guys whose offensive skills skew more towards passing, ballhandling, screening, and/or spacing the floor can get overlooked, particularly if they’re viewed as undersized, play for a school outside the media spotlight, or excel defensively based on their awareness and activity rather than a massive standing reach or vertical leap.

Foreigners from Lesser Leagues: (e.g., Nikola Jokic, Giannis Antetokounmpo, Rudy Gobert, Clint Capela, Ivica Zubac, Rodions Kurucs)

Players like Doncic who star in Euroleague and the Spanish ACB are well-known commodities entering the draft. Those who play in less-established, lower-level leagues are more difficult to evaluate for a number of reasons. Their statistics are less meaningful, fewer scouts attend their games, and there’s less (and lower-quality) video of their performances available as well. As a result, I believe that these are particularly high-variance prospects. We’ve seen a lot of these players get drafted late and excel—see the list above—but we’ve also seen a few selected with a top pick and fall well short of expectations (Mario Hezonja, Dragan Bender).

Looking more closely at the 2019 draft, I find that there are a bunch of players fitting these 3 categories who are expected to be drafted late. And as expected, beyond the consensus top 3, I’m failing to see much separation between the first 20 picks and the next 20. Here are picks #4-23 and then #24-43 in ESPN’s current mock draft, side by side:

The first column is full of NCAA freshmen, most of whom were maddeningly inconsistent or absent this past season, including Garland, Reddish, Little, Langford, Bol, Porter, and Keldon Johnson.

Yet the draft pool contains an impressive number of exceedingly productive veteran guards and wings. Players of this type in the second column include Matisse Thybulle, Ty Jerome, Grant Williams, Carsen Edwards, Dylan Windler, Terence Davis, and DaQuan Jeffries. Several others in this category are projected as late second rounders or undrafted free agents: Cody Martin, Jeremiah Martin, CJ Massinburg, and Shamorie Ponds to name a few.

There are also a few unconventional bigs in that 24-43 range: Eric Paschall, Nic Claxton, Grant Williams, Isaiah Roby, and Jontay Porter. In my view, Grant Williams fits both categories as a hybrid 3/4/5 and one of the NCAA’s most productive players. Williams, Paschall, and Roby have Small Forward height but play bigger based on strength and physicality. Claxton and Porter have Center size in terms of height and standing reach, but they play a more perimeter-oriented style of offense, heavy on facilitating and jumpshooting.

Luka Samanic (#30 above) probably falls into that unconventional big category as well, though I’m not familiar enough with him to say for sure. He’s definitely an underscouted foreigner from a lesser league though, and therefore the type of prospect I’d be wary of selecting with a top pick but excited to draft at the end of the first round or as a second rounder.

I’ll unveil my all-underrated prospect team later this week. As a precursor, I’ll note that each of the 5 players I’ve selected appears in the second column above.

On Thursday night, Nikola Mirotic played his first game for the Milwaukee Bucks, after being acquired at the trade deadline in exchange for Jason Smith, Stanley Johnson, and multiple second round draft picks. Much has been written about Niko’s fit with the team and his potential playoff impact, but what I’d really like to focus on is the amazing confluence of events that enabled the trade to happen at all.

Dealing a few second round picks and a couple expiring contracts (Smith and Johnson) for a single player looks like a fairly mundane transaction on paper, but for Milwaukee, it required a mix of planning, execution, and good fortune that’s remarkable in its complexity. The deal ultimately relied on so many trade rules, prior transactions, and favorable circumstances that it’s hard to catalog them all—yet I’ll try anyway.

(A) How Milwaukee Obtained Its Trade Assets

The assets that the Bucks exchanged for Niko came from a number of prior moves, precisely undertaken in connection with league rules and to maximize future value. Those moves include the following:

• On July 9, 2015, the Bucks traded Jared Dudley to the Wizards. Because NBA rules require that the Wizards send something back in return, Milwaukee received Washington’s top-55 protected 2020 pick—a future top-55 protected pick being the gold standard in minimal returns. Teams are not allowed to protect picks any more restrictively than that.

• On November 7, 2017, the Bucks traded Greg Monroe, a protected 1st round pick, and a 2nd round pick for Eric Bledsoe. In doing so, the Bucks gained a trade exception for $3.48 million, i.e., the difference in salaries between Monroe ($17.88M) and Bledsoe ($14.5M) plus $100,000. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(ii). That exception remained available through this past summer and into the 2018-19 season, as the Bucks operated over the salary cap and thus did not need to renounce it. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(m). That $3.48M trade exception would expire by rule on the same date the following year (November 7, 2018).

• On October 15, 2018, just a few weeks before the Monroe exception was set to expire, the Bucks used that trade exception to complete another trade with the Wizards. The Bucks acquired Jodie Meeks ($3.29M, narrowly within the $3.48M limit) and cash to help the Wizards avoid the luxury tax. In that trade, the Wizards eased the restrictions on their 2020 second rounder sent in the Jared Dudley deal, making it top-45 protected. If the pick did not convey in 2020, it would convert into an unprotected 2022 second rounder. In essence, the Bucks turned a 2020 pick that was very unlikely to convey into a pick that quite possibly would convey in 2020 and otherwise they would receive two years later.

• A couple months thereafter, on December 7, 2018 (that date is very important(!) as explained later), the Bucks completed a deal for George Hill, sending a 1st round pick, a 2nd round pick, and bad contracts to Cleveland. The Bucks completed that trade not only to improve their bench with Hill but also largely to gain long-term salary relief which they’ll need in order to retain their non-Giannis core and stay under the tax.

• While the Bucks sought to reduce long-term payroll obligations in the 12/7/18 trade, they remained willing to take on salary for the current season. Thus, they contacted their recurring trade partner, the Wizards, again offering 2018-19 luxury tax relief in exchange for assets if the Wizards wanted to make it a 3-team deal. The Wizards gladly dealt Jason Smith ($5.45M) to the Bucks in exchange for Sam Dekker ($2.76M) from the Cavs, saving several million dollars and upgrading their team at the same time. In return, the Wizards eliminated the protections on the 2020 pick altogether (which probably felt like a token gesture at the time), while sending the Bucks an additional 2nd rounder in 2021 as well. The Bucks never could have traded Dekker straight-up for Smith in a two-team trade, because their salary disparity is too large. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(i) (limiting salary received for Dekker to $4.93M, or 175% of his salary plus $100,000).

• A day before the trade deadline, on February 6, 2019, the Bucks honored Thon Maker’s trade request, dealing him to Detroit for Stanley Johnson. Yet the teams refrained from reporting the deal to the league office right away, instead looking for opportunities to build on it as the deadline approached. See 2012 NBA By-Laws Section 4.02 (establishing procedures to effect a trade, most notably including a “Trade Call” with the league office).

On deadline day, February 7, the Bucks seized their opportunity, landing Mirotic in a 3-team trade with the Pistons and Pelicans. The Bucks acquired Niko in exchange for Jason Smith, Stanley Johnson, Washington’s unprotected 2020 and 2021 second rounders, Milwaukee’s own 2020 second rounder, and a top-55 protected 2019 pick from Denver (previously acquired for Roy Hibbert in 2017). This trade would not have been possible if Milwaukee had already reported the initial Thon Maker deal, as Stanley Johnson then could not have been traded in combination with another player for two months. See CBA Article VII, Section 6(j)(iii) (two-month waiting period before aggregating an acquired player’s contract with another contract for trade purposes). The Bucks could trade Jason Smith in combination with another player on February 7 because they acquired him exactly two months prior.

(B) Why Milwaukee’s Trade Assets were Valuable and Necessary

Zach Lowe noted in his post-deadline column that the Sixers made a similar offer for Mirotic. The Sixers have compiled a bunch of second rounders from non-playoff teams, and they offered at least two of them for Niko as well, likely including one or both of the bottom-dwelling Knicks’ 2020 and 2021 picks.

As recently as three days before the trade deadline, it didn’t look like Milwaukee had the future draft assets to compete with an offer like that or to obtain any sort of impact player. Notably, the Bucks were prohibited from trading any of their own first round picks. This is due to the oft-cited “Stepien Rule,” whereby a team cannot be left without a first round selection in two consecutive future drafts. See 2012 NBA By-Laws Section 7.03. After dealing protected first rounders for Eric Bledsoe and George Hill, the Bucks had no more first round picks to trade. Their next available first rounder for trade purposes is their 2026 pick, which is just outside the allowable 7-year window for trading draft picks.

When the Bucks acquired Washington’s 2020 and 2021 second rounders, the picks did not appear to have much value, even by second round pick standards. The Wizards’ core of John Wall, Bradley Beal, and Otto Porter seemed less than championship-caliber but good enough to reliably get the Wizards a playoff spot. Under such circumstances, one would expect those picks to land in the 45-55 range.

Yet Washington’s future outlook changed drastically in the days immediately leading up to the trade deadline. On February 5, we learned that John Wall—already out for the season due to a heel injury—had ruptured his Achilles when he slipped and fell at home. That new injury would keep him out of action not only for this season but also for most if not all of next season too. That’s 35% of the salary cap for no production. Late the following day, a.k.a. trade deadline eve, the Wizards decided it was time to give up on the existing core and clear up their cap situation. They traded Otto Porter for lesser expiring contracts, leaving them with Bradley Beal as their only healthy rotation player under contract next year, yet with no substantial cap space to improve the roster given the John Wall, Ian Mahinmi, and Dwight Howard contracts.

Suddenly, on deadline day, the Wizards looked like arguably the league’s most hopeless team for the 2019-20 season. While the Knicks had a couple paths to respectability or even contention, with a likely top pick and 2 max salary slots, the Wizards were stuck with an injured and ineffective roster outside Bradley Beal and minimal resources to make things better.  

Washington’s unprotected 2020 and 2021 second round picks, which didn’t seem all that noteworthy a few days prior, had become the most desirable second rounders on the market.

Further, Jason Smith’s expiring contract wound up being exactly what the Bucks needed to pull off a trade for a relatively high-salaried player like Mirotic under the CBA rules. To deal for Niko and his $12.5M salary, Milwaukee had to send out at least $7.5M in player salary. If they hadn’t acquired Smith at least two months before the deadline, this would’ve been extremely difficult. New Orleans likely wouldn’t have accepted Ersan Ilyasova’s long-term, $7M/year contract, and he’s part of Milwaukee’s rotation anyway. To reach the necessary salary, the Bucks would’ve needed to include at least one promising young player like DJ Wilson or Donte DiVincenzo rather than merely expiring contract filler.

In short, everything came together to enable Milwaukee to trade for Niko on February 7, and the deal wouldn’t have worked even a day earlier.